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Experts often seek to apply social science to the facts of a particular case.  
Sometimes experts link social science findings to cases using only their expert 
judgment, and other times experts conduct case-specific research using social 
science principles and methods to produce case-specific evidence.  This Article 
argues against expert judgment as the means of linking general social science 
to specific cases, and for the use of methodologically rigorous case-specific 
research to produce “social facts,” or case-specific evidence derived from 
social science principles.  We explain the many ways that social fact studies 
can be conducted to yield reliable case-specific opinions, and we dispel the 
view that litigation poses insurmountable barriers to the conduct of case-
specific empirical research.  Social fact studies are feasible for both plaintiffs 
and defendants, and they provide much sounder conclusions about the 
relevance of social science to a litigated case than does linkage via expert 
judgment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since Louis Brandeis first introduced it in court over a century ago,1 
evidence drawn from social science research has played an important role in 
many forms of litigation.2  Perhaps the most prominent use of social science 
evidence occurs in employment discrimination class actions, where plaintiffs 
often rely on the testimony of an expert to identify factors within the defendant 
organization that social science studies suggest could pose a common risk of 
harm to all class members.  The prototypical example is found in Dukes v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a nationwide gender discrimination class action 
involving hundreds of thousands of women.3  A sociology expert reviewed the 
case record on Wal-Mart’s employment practices in light of “what social 
science research shows to be factors that create and sustain bias and those that 
minimize bias”4 and concluded that Wal-Mart’s practices “contribute to 
disparities between men and women in their compensation and career 
trajectories at the company.”5 
 
 1 See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 & n.1 (1908) (“[T]he brief filed by Mr. Louis D. Brandeis, 
for the defendant . . . . [included] extracts from over ninety reports of committees, bureaus of statistics, 
commissioners of hygiene, inspectors of factories, both in this country and in Europe, to the effect that long 
hours of labor are dangerous for women, primarily because of their special physical organization.”). 
 2 See generally JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW (7th ed. 2010) 
(providing history and discussion of social science as used in a variety of legal contexts). 
 3 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010).  The likely size of the class was 
a matter of some dispute between the majority and dissent in the en banc opinion issued by the Ninth Circuit.  
Id. at 578 n.3.  For information about the proposed class and the relief sought, see Plaintiffs’ Third Amended 
Complaint at 21–25, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ), 
available at http://www.impactfund.org/documents/cat_95-100/Third_Amended_Complaint.pdf.  Professor 
Nagareda describes Dukes as “the largest class action in history under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.”  Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 102 
(2009) (footnote omitted). 
 4 Declaration of William T. Bielby, Ph.D. in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 5, 
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. 137 (No. C-01-2252 MJJ), available at http://www.walmartclass.com/staticdata/ 
reports/r3.html. 
 5 Id. at 41.  The district court relied on this expert’s opinions in granting the plaintiffs’ class certification 
motion.  Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 153–54, aff’d sub nom. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007), 
aff’d in part on reh’g sub nom. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. 
granted, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010).  The initial appellate panel also allowed the expert’s opinions as evidence of 
commonality.  Dukes, 509 F.3d at 1179–80.  The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc, and a split court 
upheld the district court’s certification decision.  Dukes, 603 F.3d at 628.  We discuss in greater detail the 
opinions of the expert in Dukes—and our concerns about those opinions—in two recent publications.  See John 
Monahan, Laurens Walker & Gregory Mitchell, Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The 
Ascendance of “Social Frameworks,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1742–48 (2008) [hereinafter Monahan et al., 
Ascendance of Social Frameworks] (arguing that the expert, although claiming to present a social framework, 
testified about social facts specific to the defendant); John Monahan, Laurens Walker & Gregory Mitchell, The 
Limits of Social Framework Evidence, 8 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 307, 311–19 (2009) [hereinafter Monahan 
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The approach the expert used in Dukes has come to be known as “social 
framework analysis”—so called because an expert uses social science research 
as a framework for analyzing the facts of a particular case.6  In this approach, 
the expert uses her judgment, rather than traditional empirical methods, to link 
social science propositions to a particular case.7  For instance, the expert in 
Dukes conducted no observational, statistical, or experimental tests to 
determine whether any particular employment practice of Wal-Mart actually 
contributed to sex disparities in pay; he simply reviewed discovery materials 
and judged Wal-Mart’s practices to contain features that social science studies 
suggest can be associated with intergroup bias.8  This method has been 
 
et al., Limits of Social Frameworks] (noting a lack of objective measurements to ensure facts were true and 
representative of all of defendant’s locations). 
 6 Professors Susan Fiske and Eugene Borgida first used this phrase as an extension of Walker and 
Monahan’s “social frameworks” concept, which involves using general social science evidence to provide a 
frame of reference or background information to assist the factfinder deciding issues in a specific case.  
Compare Susan T. Fiske & Eugene Borgida, Social Framework Analysis as Expert Testimony in Sexual 
Harassment Suits, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 
51ST ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 575, 577 (Samuel Estreicher ed., 1999) (“A social framework analysis 
uses general conclusions from tested, reliable, peer-reviewed social science research and applies it to the case 
at hand.”), with Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 
73 VA. L. REV. 559, 559 (1987) (“[G]eneral research results are used to construct a frame of reference or 
background context for deciding factual issues crucial to the resolution of a specific case.  We call 
this . . . social frameworks.”).  Whereas Walker and Monahan envisioned judicial instructions on reliable 
social science propositions that would provide jurors with new general information to help them make sense of 
the case-specific evidence, Fiske and Borgida described a “newer methodology of social framework analysis” 
in which “[c]onclusions aggregated from the research literature are applied to particular cases” by expert 
witnesses.  Fiske & Borgida, supra, at 575–77.  As we have discussed previously, in our view case-specific 
opinions based on Fiske and Borgida’s “social framework analysis” violate basic rules of expert evidence and 
scientific reliability and should not be confused with Walker and Monahan’s conception of social framework 
evidence.  See Monahan et al., Ascendance of Social Frameworks, supra note 5, at 1746 n.84 (“Whereas 
Walker and Monahan expressly argued that any inferences to be drawn from the general research to the 
specific case should be the province of the fact-finder working within a court’s instructions, Fiske and Borgida 
expressly advocated that experts make such linkages for the fact-finder . . . .”); Monahan et al., Limits of Social 
Frameworks, supra note 5, at 311–19 (arguing that any opinion based on intuition, instead of reliable methods, 
falls short of the rigorous post-Daubert standard for expert testimony).  For a recent opinion excluding 
testimony by Dr. Borgida based on “social framework analysis,” see EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P., No. 07 Civ. 
8383(LAP), slip op. at 14–15 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2010) (stating, among other reasons for excluding Dr. 
Borgida’s opinions, that “he relied on insufficient facts and data” and “the opinions in [his] report are 
supported by what appears to be a ‘because I said so’ explanation”).  To avoid confusion, we place “social 
framework analysis” in quotation marks wherever the phrase is used to refer to experts using their personal 
judgment rather than scientific methods to link social science to specific cases. 
 7 See Monahan et al., Limits of Social Frameworks, supra note 5, at 315 (noting that experts using 
“social framework analysis” fill gaps with causal judgments that are not based on accepted methods of causal 
testing). 
 8 Id. at 314–17. 
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developed by experts exclusively for use in litigation.  As the expert for the 
Dukes plaintiffs testified in a subsequent case: 
[S]ocial framework analysis is a legal term and not a scientific term.  
It’s a label that’s been applied to what social scientists do when they 
come into a litigation context.  Issues of causality in the social 
sciences have a long and rich methodological tradition that has 
nothing to do with social framework analysis.9 
In stark contrast to those experts who engage in conjectural “social 
framework analysis,” other experts do use traditional social scientific 
techniques to assess conditions directly relevant to the case at hand.  For 
instance, a psychologist may conduct an experiment to determine whether a 
photo lineup suggested the defendant as the perpetrator,10 or an economist may 
estimate the impact of alleged monopolistic practices on consumer prices using 
econometric analyses of market data.11  In these instances, the expert applies 
scientific principles and methods to case-specific data in the same way that the 
expert would use scientific principles and methods to analyze data outside the 
litigation context.  When social scientific principles and methods are used to 
develop opinions about the parties, practices, or behaviors involved in a 
particular case, such evidence has been referred to as “social facts.”12 
This Article addresses the scientific and legal merits of using social science 
techniques to develop evidence specific to a particular case and argues for the 
use of methodologically rigorous social fact studies whenever experts seek to 
 
 9 Videotaped Deposition of William T. Bielby, Ph.D., Taken 01-15-08, at 105–06, EEOC v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., No. 6:01-CV-339-KKC, 2010 WL 583681 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 16, 2010), 2008 WL 6858762.  Dr. 
Bielby’s opinions in this case were recently excluded, in part, because those opinions, which were based on 
“social framework analysis,” were not sufficiently connected to the case at hand.  See Wal-Mart Stores, 2010 
WL 583681, at *4 (“The burden . . . is on the plaintiff to prove that intentional discrimination occurred at this 
particular distribution center, not just that gender stereotyping or intentional discrimination is prevalent in the 
world.  Dr. Bielby does not opine on whether intentional discrimination occurred at the distribution center.”). 
 10 For a web-based demonstration of such a study, see Consultation and Expert Testimony, EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION RESEARCH LAB., http://eyewitness.utep.edu/consult01.html (last visited May 20, 2011). 
 11 See, e.g., California v. Infineon Techs. AG, No. C 06-4333 PJH, 2008 WL 4155665, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 5, 2008) (“As is the norm in complex antitrust cases, the parties have weighed in on both sides of this 
question with reference to the testimony of supporting experts, who present conflicting econometric models in 
support of their contrasting conclusions.”). 
 12 See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 
CALIF. L. REV. 877, 881–82 & n.26 (1988).  Thus, when we speak here of social facts or social fact studies, we 
mean case-specific evidence produced through the application of reliable social science principles and methods 
to case-specific data, and when we speak of “social framework analysis,” we mean case-specific evidence 
produced through an expert’s application of social science findings to a particular case using expert judgment 
rather than traditional empirical methods. 
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link social science principles to particular cases.13  We explain the many ways 
that social fact studies can be conducted to yield reliable case-specific 
opinions, and we seek to dispel the view that litigation poses insurmountable 
barriers to the conduct of case-specific empirical research.  We conclude that 
social fact studies are feasible for both plaintiffs and defendants—with or 
without special access to the parties involved in a case—and provide much 
sounder conclusions about the relevance of social science to a litigated case 
than does “social framework analysis.” 
We proceed in three Parts.  In Part I, we situate social facts in the context of 
other uses of social science evidence for legal purposes, and we describe a 
number of research methodologies that generate social facts.  In Part II, we 
explain that social fact studies, when done properly, possess scientific 
reliability and “fit” the facts of a particular case,14 as required of any expert 
evidence under current Federal Rules.15  We pay particular attention to the 
evidentiary benefits of social facts under the fit requirement, and we discuss 
how to assess the fit of social science research offered in a particular case.  In 
Part III, we examine key legal and ethical issues concerning access to the data 
needed to conduct case-specific studies and the protection of study 
participants.  Although the benefits of social fact research are already 
appreciated in several domains,16 the feasibility and potential value of social 
 
 13 It is important to note that our rejection of “social framework analysis” applies with equal force to all 
parties to litigation.  Although experts for plaintiffs appear to use this approach more commonly in civil cases 
than defendants, defense experts have used this approach.  See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Admissibility 
of Expert Testimony Regarding the Lack of Race Based Preferential Treatment by Thompson or Skipper at 2, 
Rice v. Or. Dep’t of Corr., No. 04C-19412 (Or. Cir. Ct. Feb. 12, 2008), 2008 WL 3886606 (“Defendants 
anticipate the testimony of the following expert witness: Dr. M. Kahlil Zonoozy will testify as an expert about 
social framework evidence based upon his review of witness testimony.  Dr. Zonoozy will opine that there 
were inaccurate perceptions at issue in the workplace at Santiam in 2003 and 2004.  These inaccurate 
perceptions related to race.  He will further opine that he saw no evidence of race-based preferential treatment 
by Superintendent Thompson of Security Manager Carter and Officer Skipper.”).  We find this approach 
unacceptable regardless of the offering party. 
 14 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–92 (1993) (noting that Federal Rule 
of Evidence 702 requires expert evidence to be both relevant and helpful). 
 15 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147–48 (1999) (determining that Rule 702 applies to all 
expert testimony, not just that which is “scientific”). 
 16 The benefits of social fact studies are perhaps best appreciated in the domain of trademark litigation.  
An American court first admitted a consumer confusion survey in a trademark dispute in 1940.  See Oneida, 
Ltd. v. Nat’l Silver Co., 25 N.Y.S.2d 271, 286 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (explaining how females were asked to identify 
the maker of silverware to measure possible confusion between the two products).  Parties to trademark 
disputes now routinely rely on survey evidence to show consumer confusion or lack thereof.  See Neal Miller, 
Facts, Expert Facts, and Statistics: Descriptive and Experimental Research Methods in Litigation, 40 
RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 137 (1987); Natalie-Claire Woods, Survey, Survey Evidence in Lanham Act Violations, 
15 TRINITY L. REV. 67, 71 (2008) (“In fact, out-of-court consumer polling is perhaps the most well received 
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fact research commend its use across many types of cases for many kinds of 
questions.  Proper social fact studies should replace “social framework 
analysis.” 
I. SOCIAL FACTS DEFINED AND DESCRIBED 
Social facts, as defined by Walker and Monahan,17 are a type of 
“adjudicative fact[],” as defined by Kenneth Culp Davis almost 60 years ago.18  
The Federal Rules of Evidence incorporated Davis’s definition of adjudicative 
facts into Rule 201’s provisions on the kinds of facts that may be judicially 
noticed, and the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 201 provides guidance on 
the meaning and scope of adjudicative facts—those “which relate to the 
parties”: 
When a court or an agency finds facts concerning the immediate 
parties—who did what, where, when, how, and with what motive or 
intent—the court or agency is performing an adjudicative function, 
and the facts are conveniently called adjudicative facts. . . . 
Stated in other terms, the adjudicative facts are those to which 
the law is applied in the process of adjudication.  They are the facts 
that normally go to the jury in a jury case.  They relate to the parties, 
their activities, their properties, their businesses.19 
Social facts, then, are a special type of adjudicative fact, produced by 
applying social science techniques to case-specific data in order to help prove 
some issue in the case.20  One of the most common examples of a social fact is 
statistical evidence in a discrimination case used to prove that a protected 
category status was a reliable predictor of employment outcomes at a particular 
 
method of introducing, either directly or as an expert witness opinion, evidence regarding the reactions of the 
public to the trademarks at issue.  These surveys and polls are used to determine the aforementioned issues of 
confusion, secondary meaning, and suggestiveness or generic nature of a trademark.  Results of the surveys are 
offered into evidence directly or as opinion of an expert witness.” (footnotes omitted)).  We discuss a number 
of examples of social facts in trademark cases in Part II below. 
 17 See Walker & Monahan, supra note 12, at 881 & n.26 (contrasting their definition of “social fact” with 
that of Marvell, whose definition of the term was closer to Davis’s definition of “legislative fact” (quoting 
Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 
364, 423–25 (1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 18 See generally Davis, supra note 17, at 402 (“When an agency finds facts concerning immediate 
parties—what the parties did, what the circumstances were, what the background conditions were—the agency 
is performing an adjudicative function, and the facts may conveniently be called adjudicative facts.”). 
 19 FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s note (alteration in original) (quoting 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 353 (1958)). 
 20 Walker & Monahan, supra note 12, at 881. 
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organization.21  In such cases, a statistician, economist, or other social scientist 
with statistical training analyzes case-specific applicant or employee data using 
reliable statistical techniques to assess the impact of various employee 
characteristics (e.g., race, education level, prior experience) on outcomes and 
to estimate the likelihood that any observed disparities associated with the 
protected category variable (race, in this example) would arise from chance 
after controlling for disparities associated with other variables (education and 
experience, in this example).22 
A. Comparing Social Facts to Social Authority and Social Frameworks 
Social fact evidence can be contrasted with “social authority”23 and “social 
framework”24 evidence, the other two broad categories of evidence derived 
from social science research.  Social science research serves as social authority 
when general-causation principles (e.g., the impact of segregation on 
educational achievement) or descriptions drawn from general social science 
research (e.g., aggregated responses to attitude surveys) serve as the basis for 
law making.25  For instance, congressional committees considered social 
 
 21 See id. at 880 (identifying the common use of social science research as a fact-finding tool in Title VII 
cases). 
 22 Of course, there will be differences of opinion as to the best model to use to estimate these effects, but 
so long as a defensible, reliable approach is applied to adequate data, these differences of opinion will not 
necessarily render the statistical opinions inadmissible.  See, e.g., Steven L. Willborn & Ramona L. Paetzold, 
Statistics Is a Plural Word, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 48, 56 (2008), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/ 
willborn_paetzold.pdf (“All statistical methods involve a host of underlying assumptions.  In an ideal world, 
whenever a particular method is used, all of its underlying assumptions would be perfectly and fully met, 
especially in situations involving issues as important as civil rights.  But in practice, with real-world data, this 
simply does not happen.  For this reason, among others, experts have to make choices. . . .  What is important 
in both social science and litigation is that the expert reveal the choices that were made and the extent to which 
assumptions are met.” (footnote omitted)). 
 23 See generally John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and 
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 478 (1986) (proposing a shift to consideration of 
empirical data as “social authority”). 
 24 See generally Walker & Monahan, supra note 6, at 559 (describing the use of general research results 
to construct a frame of reference for analyzing factual issues). 
 25 See Monahan & Walker, supra note 23, at 499 (“Courts should place confidence in a piece of scientific 
research to the extent that the research . . . is generalizable to the case at issue . . . .”).  Social authority is 
similar to Davis’s conception of “legislative facts.”  See Davis, supra note 17, at 402.  Monahan and Walker 
argued that social science used as the basis for legislative facts should be seen as a source of legal authority 
rather than as a source of facts and hence the label “social authority.”  Monahan & Walker, supra note 23, at 
488.  Conceiving social science as legal authority rather than factual information affects how social science 
should be presented to courts or other law-making bodies, how social science should be evaluated by those 
bodies, and how resistant to change laws based on social science should be (i.e., the precedential value of 
social science and the conditions under which social authority should be altered).  See id. at 495–516 
(suggesting ways in which courts should treat social science evidence). 
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science research on discrimination against older workers, and the enacted 
version of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act contained findings 
drawn from this research to show the need for greater protection of older 
workers.26  Reconceiving social science used for general law-making purposes 
as social authority instead of legislative facts, as it is treated by Davis,27 
encourages courts to treat social science as an analogue to legal precedent that 
can be revisited as the social science evolves.28 
Social science research serves as social framework evidence when general-
causation principles or descriptive information drawn from general social 
science research provides a frame of reference or context that may help jurors 
understand the meaning of case-specific evidence admitted at trial.29  For 
instance, research on the relationship between eyewitness confidence and 
accuracy may help a juror evaluate eyewitness testimony in a case.30  
Similarly, information about the frequency with which abuse victims continue 
to interact with their abusers may be used to counter possible misconceptions 
about the relationship between a defendant and the alleged victim.31  Social 
frameworks inhabit a middle ground between social authority and social facts: 
social frameworks involve general propositions drawn from social science 
research (as does social authority), but these general propositions are used by 
the factfinder to help resolve a dispute in a specific case (as are social facts).32 
Social facts thus differ from social authority and social frameworks in two 
significant and interrelated respects: (1) social facts involve case-specific 
descriptive or causal claims, whereas social authority and social frameworks 
involve general propositions about causation or about the prevalence of certain 
behaviors, characteristics, or outcomes in the aggregate; and (2) because social 
facts involve case-specific claims, social facts require the application of sound 
 
 26 29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (2006). 
 27 See Davis, supra note 17, at 402 (classifying evidence that informs legislative judgment as “legislative 
facts”). 
 28 For a discussion of the implications of viewing social science as social authority rather than as 
legislative facts, see John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Empirical Questions Without Empirical Answers, 1991 
WIS. L. REV. 569, 573–74. 
 29 Walker & Monahan, supra note 6, at 559. 
 30 See, e.g., State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208, 1223–24 (Ariz. 1983) (holding that the exclusion of expert 
testimony on the factors that affect the reliability of eyewitness identifications was reversible error). 
 31 See, e.g., People v. McGuiness, 665 N.Y.S.2d 752, 754 (App. Div. 1997) (finding no error in the 
admission of expert testimony “explaining behavior that would otherwise appear unusual to the average juror; 
for example, why a victim of sexual abuse might not immediately report such abuse, as is the case here, or why 
a child would continue contact and maintain a relationship with the abuser”). 
 32 Monahan et al., Ascendance of Social Frameworks, supra note 5, at 1725–27. 
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methods and principles to case-specific data to reach descriptive and causal 
conclusions about the case at hand.  As alluded to in the Introduction, “social 
framework analysis” of the kind performed by the plaintiffs’ expert in Dukes 
conflates what we call social frameworks and social facts because the expert, 
basing his opinions only on general social science research, offers case-specific 
claims without conducting case-specific research using generally accepted 
social science methods.33  If general social science principles are to be linked 
to a specific case by a social science expert, then those linkage opinions need 
to be based on a social fact study and not on a naked claim of expert judgment 
that is the equivalent of ipse dixit.34 
B. Types of Social Facts 
A wide variety of social science methods can be used to produce social 
facts.  What a party hopes to learn should drive the design of a social fact study 
because different research designs have different possibilities and limitations.  
In some cases, the goal will be description.  In other cases, learning why some 
outcomes or behaviors occurred, and why others did not, may be the goal.  In 
yet other cases, testing the parties’ case-specific hypotheses may be the goal. 
1. Obtaining Descriptive Information 
Typically, parties rely on their own discovery statements and testimony, the 
testimony of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) representatives, and the 
testimony of nonparty witnesses to provide descriptive information about a 
case.  In many cases, a descriptive social fact study could provide more reliable 
information about facts relevant to a case.  For instance, parties to a trademark 
dispute can present the testimony of a few consumers who were and were not 
 
 33 See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 152 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (describing the expert’s 
conclusions about Wal-Mart’s practices following a review of the evidence and organizational research on the 
topic), aff’d sub nom. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d in part on reh’g sub nom. 
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010). 
 34 See Monahan et al., Limits of Social Frameworks, supra note 5, at 317–18 (noting that a reliance on 
experience, alone, lacks the necessary scientific rigor for admission); David L. Faigman, Evidentiary 
Incommensurability: A Preliminary Exploration of the Problem of Reasoning from General Scientific Data to 
Individualized Legal Decision-Making, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1115, 1135 (2010) (“Put another way, scientist-
experts are limited to testifying about what their respective field’s research can validly add to fact-finders’ 
deliberations—and nothing more.  This injunction, however, is not always followed.  In particular, experts 
frequently seek to comment not simply on the import of general research findings, but on whether a particular 
case fits those findings.  Scientific research that permits a valid description of a general phenomenon, however, 
does not invariably give experts the capacity to validly determine whether an individual case is an instance of 
that general phenomenon.”). 
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confused about the source of a product, or they can present the results of a 
study that systematically assessed confusion among consumers.35  Courts have 
recognized the superiority of the latter evidence, so much so that a failure to 
introduce a consumer confusion survey can lead to an adverse inference 
against the claimant.36  Another example of a survey used for descriptive social 
fact purposes is found in high-profile cases where attorneys seek to buttress 
their arguments that unfavorable press justifies a change of venue with surveys 
designed to measure the negative impact of pretrial publicity on the attitudes 
and beliefs of potential jurors.37  Community surveys often figure prominently 
as well in obscenity cases, where they are used to gauge local views toward the 
materials in question.38  Other methods can also be used to count or summarize 
relevant data.  For instance, descriptive summary statistics based on an analysis 
of employee records may be used to give substance to anecdotal evidence of 
discrimination in a disparate treatment case (along with statistics-based causal 
claims about the sources of any disparity).39 
Where the goal is descriptive, the particular research design will depend on 
the things to be counted or described.  If the researcher seeks to tabulate or 
describe only historical facts, then a research design that ensures reliable 
collection and review of adequate case-specific historical data will be needed.40  
 
 35 See, e.g., Pharmacia Corp. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 335, 368 (D.N.J. 2002) (looking to a 
survey of ophthalmologists and optometrists to determine that they could readily distinguish between the 
pharmaceuticals at issue). 
 36 See id. at 373 (“The Court is aware that Pharmacia is not legally required to conduct a confusion 
survey.  But under the circumstances of this case, Pharmacia’s failure to conduct any confusion survey weighs 
against its request for a preliminary injunction.  Such a failure, particularly when the trademark owner is 
financially able, justifies an inference ‘that the plaintiff believes the results of the survey will be unfavorable.’” 
(quoting Charles Jacquin et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 921 F.2d 467, 475 (3d Cir. 1990))). 
 37 See Christina A. Studebaker et al., Assessing Pretrial Publicity Effects: Integrating Content Analytic 
Results, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 317, 319–20 (2000) (“Public opinion surveying has been referred to as ‘the 
technique of choice for showing that a likelihood of prejudice exists’ because a large number of people in the 
relevant community can be contacted relatively quickly in order to assess the amount of knowledge people 
have about a case (presumably derived from pretrial publicity) and their opinions about the defendant.” 
(quoting Michael T. Nietzel & Ronald C. Dillehay, Psychologists as Consultants for Changes of Venue: The 
Use of Public Opinion Surveys, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 309, 312 (1983))). 
 38 See, e.g., State v. Williams, 598 N.E.2d 1250, 1257 (Oh. Ct. App. 1991) (“[A] properly conducted 
opinion poll may be relevant to a determination of whether the particular film in question is obscene.  On the 
issue of relevance, the poll must be relevant to a determination of both community standards in general and the 
community’s acceptance of viewing the particular film in question.”). 
 39 See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307–08 (1977) (“Where gross 
statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or 
practice of discrimination.”). 
 40 The key is to develop a systematic protocol for categorizing the data based on the facts of interest 
using a consistent level of analysis.  See generally GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC 
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If the researcher seeks to describe ongoing behaviors, outcomes, beliefs, or 
other present facts, then historical data will need to be supplemented with new 
data, either via a survey or observational study.41  In either case, it may be 
appropriate to sample the available evidence, rather than attempt to tabulate 
every fact, depending on the amount of data involved and the amount of data 
needed to reach reliable descriptive inferences.42  For instance, state revenue 
agencies often use statistically reliable samples of sales or use records in 
connection with tax audits, and this evidence can play a key role in 
administrative or court proceedings.43 
In all cases, getting the facts right is important, but doing so can be 
particularly difficult when the relevant facts are in the possession of large 
numbers of nonparties, as in trademark disputes, or where the data is 
voluminous, as in many class actions or business cases involving a tremendous 
number of transactions recorded electronically.  In such cases, a social fact 
study may be necessary to ensure a reliable factual basis for the court’s legal 
conclusions or to help the court navigate through complex and contested 
evidence.44 
2. Obtaining Explanatory Information 
Where a party seeks explanatory information, or to gain a better 
understanding of the issues in a case, the nature of the outcomes or behaviors 
to be studied will determine the nature of the research design.  If the outcome, 
event, or behavior to be explained is embedded in a rich social environment, 
then an interview, survey, or observational study may be appropriate for 
 
INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1994) (discussing the importance of rigorous analysis of qualitative 
data). 
 41 An example of an observational social fact study conducted for descriptive purposes is found in 
Sepulveda v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a wage-and-hour case, where the defendant offered an observational study 
of the work of assistant managers as evidence of time spent in exempt versus nonexempt activities.  237 
F.R.D. 229, 236 (C.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 275 F. App’x 672 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 42 For a discussion of the uses of sampling techniques to gather evidence in complex cases, see Laurens 
Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Evidence at the Crossroads, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 969 (2007). 
 43 See, e.g., Aerostructures Corp. v. Revenue Comm’r, No. 03-1412-III, 2004 WL 3528278, at *2 (Tenn. 
Ch. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004) (“The Court finds from the proof that this was an appropriate case in which to perform a 
sample audit.  The Court finds that the volume of the taxpayer’s records was too large to audit them. . . .  [T]he 
Court finds that all the criteria the Department requires for a sample audit were present, and the sample audit 
was a reasonable method for the Department to use in this case to determine tax liability.”). 
 44 Such a study could be performed by experts for the parties or by a court-appointed expert.  See 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.51, at 112 (2004) (discussing the benefits of court-
appointed experts).  A court-appointed expert can assemble her own facts and is not limited to considering the 
evidence presented by the parties and their experts.  See id. § 11.51, at 113. 
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learning why people seem to behave in particular ways and whether others 
have proper expectations about behavior.  For example, an observational study 
of work performance may be particularly useful to an expert’s understanding 
of the job relatedness of items on a selection test.45  Similarly, if the goal is to 
explore the impact of changes in conditions on behaviors or outcomes across a 
range of assumptions, then a computer simulation may be appropriate.46  If the 
thing to be explained is a historical event unlikely to recur, then an interview or 
survey study may be appropriate as well as an experiment designed to simulate 
the event (to the extent possible). 
An experimental simulation will be particularly appropriate for simple 
historical events.  A good example is found in the case of Gil v. Mazzuca, 
which involved the manslaughter prosecution of a man who threw a bucket of 
hardened plaster off an apartment building roof, killing a police officer on the 
street below.47  Mr. Gil claimed that he meant for the bucket to hit an empty 
sidewalk near the police officer and did not believe the bucket could reach 
him.48  To support his case, Gil offered the testimony of a clinical psychologist 
who examined Gil and found cognitive deficits that affected his judgment, a 
physicist who testified about the trajectory of a bucket under specified 
conditions, and an experimental psychologist who studied people’s beliefs 
about physics to testify about lay misconceptions.49  The experimental 
psychologist conducted an experiment in which individuals threw a bucket off 
a roof under physical conditions designed to simulate those in Gil’s case and 
found that the great majority of participants overshot their target, 
 
 45 See, e.g., Wayne F. Cascio, Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: Lessons from Two High-Profile 
Cases, in SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE 143, 145 (Faye J. Crosby et al. eds., 2007) (relating 
testimony based on observations of how firefighters performed rescues). 
 46 Computer simulations may be particularly appropriate when the relevant characteristics of agents or 
organizational practices can be defined using clear parameters, and the effect of one characteristic on another 
can be mathematically modeled or reduced to symbolic logic.  See generally Eliot R. Smith & Frederica R. 
Conrey, Agent-Based Modeling: A New Approach for Theory Building in Social Psychology, 11 PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 87, 88 (2007).  Thomas Schelling’s study of neighborhood segregation illustrates the 
effective use of agent-based modeling in assessing the impact of environmental conditions on individual 
behaviors.  Id. at 89.  Schelling’s model assumed that each individual would avoid neighborhoods in which he 
would have minority status.  Id.  Thus, where a party’s theory of the case can be converted into clear 
behavioral or organizational rules that should have certain impacts on some dependent measure, a computer 
simulation may be used to test the theory or, more likely, to estimate the range of effects that should be 
observed in the actual case. 
 47 91 F. Supp. 2d 586, 587–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 48 Id. at 588. 
 49 Id. 
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underestimating the distance the bucket would travel.50  The trial court 
admitted the testimony of the clinical psychologist and the physicist but 
excluded the testimony of the experimental psychologist on grounds that 
participants in the academic and social fact experiment were not acting under 
equivalent circumstances, namely, that none of the study participants were 
throwing the bucket under conditions of agitation or anger (i.e., the testimony 
was barred due to a lack of fit or external validity).51  While this ruling seems 
well within the judge’s discretion,52 we could imagine another judge admitting 
the results of the study to support the defendant’s theory of factual mistake if 
there were evidence indicating that the intended landing area was a safe zone.53  
The larger point is that the case illustrates how a simple event can be simulated 
to support or counter what a party claims to have thought or understood about 
the event in question. 
In some cases, a social fact study may help to determine what potential 
jurors believe about social science phenomena relevant to the case and whether 
social framework testimony on the phenomena might assist the jurors.  For 
instance, to bolster the argument for admission of expert testimony on the 
fallibility of memory in I. Lewis (“Scooter”) Libby’s obstruction of justice 
trial, the defense submitted evidence from a survey of jury-eligible citizens in 
the District of Columbia on their beliefs about the workings of memory.54  The 
court concluded that this survey and other evidence did not establish that jurors 
 
 50 Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Psychological Ass’n in Support of Appellant at 11–12, People v. 
Gil, 674 N.Y.S.2d 651 (App. Div. 1998) (No. 10639/93), available at http://www.apa.org/ 
about/offices/ogc/amicus/people.pdf (“Dr. McCloskey had nineteen men do exactly what appellant did—throw 
a bucket of plaster from a building.  The results were exactly what one would expect [in light of Dr. 
McCloskey’s prior intuitive physics research]: seventeen of 19 men threw the bucket of cement beyond the 
target—some as much as 25 feet beyond—despite the fact that almost all of the respondents thought they had 
hit the target or fallen short.  (More than half thought they had fallen short.)”). 
 51 Gil, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 588–89 & n.1. 
 52 See id. at 591 (“Nowhere in all of petitioner’s 57-page brief in support of this writ, or in oral argument 
before this court, or in our own independent research, were we able to find any cases that stand for the 
proposition that the expert testimony offered here is constitutionally mandated.  On the contrary, the trial 
judge’s evaluation that the proposed expert testimony differs enough from the facts of this case that it might 
confuse the jury is precisely the sort of discretionary judgment that courts are permitted to make.”). 
 53 The district court considering Gil’s habeas petition emphasized that even if Gil had intended to land 
the bucket on the sidewalk, such behavior was still likely reckless in light of the number of people in the area 
with immediate access to the sidewalk.  See id. at 592 (“[W]e concur with the trial and appellate courts’ 
evaluation that the issue of whether petitioner intended the bucket to hit the sidewalk or the street does not 
assist the jury in determining whether such an act is reckless.  Even assuming that petitioner did in fact make 
sure that no one was on the sidewalk when he ‘lobbed’ the bucket, any number of scenarios could have 
resulted in someone from petitioner’s building or the crowd of onlookers entering the zone of danger once the 
bucket had left petitioner’s hands.”). 
 54 United States v. Libby, 461 F. Supp. 2d 3, 10 (D.D.C. 2006). 
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were so unaware of the foibles of memory that they would be aided by the 
expert testimony.55  Had the survey been more closely tailored to the issues of 
the case and shown greater disparity between lay beliefs and social science 
findings, the testimony might have been admitted.56 
Implementing social fact studies to gain an understanding of the causes and 
consequences of behaviors may be particularly helpful for remedial purposes, 
especially in structural reform litigation, where courts are often seen as 
insufficiently situated institutionally to gather the information needed to 
understand the nature of a problem and formulate effective policies.57  An 
example of a study undertaken for litigation purposes that ultimately had far-
reaching remedial impact was the observational study of traffic stops 
performed for the case of State v. Soto.58  In Soto, a group of African-American 
plaintiffs alleged that the New Jersey State Police had engaged in 
discriminatory enforcement of traffic laws from 1988 to 1991 and sought 
suppression of evidence gathered during their traffic stops.59  To support their 
claim, the plaintiffs introduced a survey designed by a psychologist of traffic 
stops along a segment of the New Jersey Turnpike involving three exits.60  The 
research team observed the race both of motorists stopped and of violators not 
stopped by police, and found that black motorists were stopped at a 
disproportionately high rate.61  The trial court found this evidence to be proof 
of a de facto policy of the police to target black motorists,62 but the study’s 
 
 55 Id. at 18 (“Based on the foregoing, the Court cannot conclude that the defendant has satisfied his 
burden of establishing that the expert testimony of Dr. Bjork will be helpful to the jury.  Not only are the 
studies offered by the defendant inapposite to the situation here, but the theories upon which Dr. Bjork would 
testify are not beyond the ken of the average juror.”). 
 56 See id. at 16 (“[E]ven if this Court could accept the proposition that these research studies support the 
defendant’s proposition that jurors do not have an understanding of memory errors such as the errors that 
allegedly occurred in this case, which it cannot do, the Court declines to accept the findings of these studies for 
a more basic reason—the reliability of these studies as applied to this case is questionable.”). 
 57 See Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 941–42 
(2003) (“Even the most enthusiastic defenders of structural reform litigation recognize that courts are at best 
‘sub optimal decision makers’ in [prison reform].”).  Dorf notes that “problem-solving courts,” especially 
some drug courts, have recognized the benefits of systematic review of case outcomes by persons with 
expertise in program evaluation.  See id. at 939 (noting the Center for Court Innovation’s efforts to systematize 
monitoring of treatment providers and the potential for such monitoring regimes to ratchet up performance 
benchmarks nationwide). 
 58 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996). 
 59 Id. at 352. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 352–54. 
 62 Id. at 360–61. 
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impact was felt far beyond the suppression of evidence in Soto—this case-
specific study led to a systemic review of police practices in New Jersey.63 
3. Testing Specific Hypotheses 
Where a litigant desires to test a case-specific hypothesis, the research 
design should emphasize control over the independent variables (“a cause in a 
causal relationship”64) and accurate measurement of the dependent variables 
(“the consequence in a causal relationship”65), so that valid conclusions about 
causation can be reached.66  The ideal means of testing a causal hypothesis is 
through use of an experiment in which participants are randomly assigned to 
different experimental conditions and their behaviors are recorded to assess 
how changes in experimental conditions affect the behavior in question.67 
 
 63 See Commonwealth v. Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688, 701 n.29 (Mass. 2008) (“The Soto decision had far-
ranging effects within New Jersey.  It led to a review of the law enforcement practices of the New Jersey State 
police, which led the New Jersey Attorney General to conclude ‘that defendants perceived to be African-
American, Black or Hispanic are entitled to discovery [regarding racial profiling] for motor vehicle stops that 
originated as a result of observations made by [New Jersey] State Troopers.’  In 2000, the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey issued an administrative order, at the request of the New Jersey Attorney General, assigning one 
judge to hear all motions for discovery relating to racial profiling by the New Jersey State police to ensure 
‘centralized judicial management’ of the rapidly emerging issue.” (alterations in original) (citations omitted) 
(quoting State v. Lee, 920 A.2d 80, 82, 85 (N.J. 2007))).  Accordingly, this study, which was designed for 
social fact purposes (i.e., to assess whether the New Jersey police engaged in the practice of racial profiling 
that was likely to have affected the plaintiffs adversely), wound up being used as social authority. 
 64 DONALD P. SCHWAB, RESEARCH METHODS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL STUDIES 303 (2d ed. 2005). 
 65 Id. at 301. 
 66 A hypothesis need not be causal in nature—it may posit some other association among variables 
without specifying a causal relation.  We focus more attention on causal hypotheses, however, as they are 
often the hypotheses of interest in cases.  Many studies undertaken for testing purposes will lead to 
explanatory information, and many studies undertaken to better understand a phenomenon may involve testing 
of a case-specific hypothesis.  But the latter need not involve testing of a hypothesis, causal or otherwise, for it 
may be designed to lead to alternative theories of a case or to understand how pieces of evidence fit together in 
the minds of the actors involved. 
 67 See Stephen G. West, Alternatives to Randomized Experiments, 18 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 299, 299 (2009) (“The randomized experiment (RE) enjoys a reputation as the gold standard of research 
designs.  When this design can be properly implemented and its assumptions are met, it enables making strong, 
transparent inferences about causality that are unrivaled by those produced by other designs.”).  Ideally, an 
experiment would also involve random selection of participants, but true random selection of experimental 
participants is rare.  GEOFFREY KEPPEL & SHELDON ZEDECK, DATA ANALYSIS FOR RESEARCH DESIGNS 16 
(1989).  Random assignment is typically an adequate control for differences that individual participants bring 
to the study that could affect how they react to the experimental tests if sample sizes are sufficient.  See id. at 
16–17 (“Random assignment is critical to the assumption that the groups formed prior to the introduction of 
the experimental treatments are equal . . . .”).  Individual differences of participants may be an important 
influence on how individuals respond to various experimental conditions, but these differences should cancel 
one another out with random assignment and adequate sample size so that an influence of the independent 
variables on the dependant variable can be detected.  See id. (“If subjects can be considered equal at the outset, 
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Perhaps the best example of a social fact experiment is a “tester study,” in 
which potential plaintiffs from a protected group and comparable others 
outside the group pose as job or loan applicants, renters, or home buyers to test 
whether members of the different groups are treated differently by employers, 
lenders, landlords, or sellers.68  In correspondence tester studies, a matched set 
of application materials are compiled that differ only with respect to indicators 
of the sex or race of the applicant (the independent variable), employers are 
randomly selected and assigned to receive one set of application materials, and 
the number of interviews granted to the matched applicants (the dependent 
variable) is measured.69  With in-person tester studies, members of two races 
or opposite sexes, who are matched for appearance and qualifications and are 
trained to answer queries equivalently, apply in person for jobs, with employer 
treatment of each being recorded shortly after each interaction.70  
Correspondence tests are cheaper and easier to implement than in-person tests, 
but it can be difficult to send clear cues about race (clearer expectations about 
the sex associated with certain names makes this less problematic for gender 
tester studies) in correspondence materials, and a limited range of jobs use 
electronic or mail solicitations for candidates.71  In-person tests avoid the 
problem of signaling demographic status because of the personal interactions 
involved, and in-person tests gather a greater range of dependent measures, but 
they are costlier and more difficult to implement than correspondence tests.72  
Either type of study when done well, however, will provide reliable 
information about the likelihood of a particular defendant to discriminate on 
the basis of sex, race, or some other protected trait.73 
 
then any differences that occur after introduction of a treatment can be attributed to the experimenter’s 
intervention.”).  Nevertheless, more detailed testing may reveal that individual differences interact with the 
experimental variables to produce different patterns of results for different groups.  See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, 
Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ 
Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 140–42 (2002) (discussing sex differences in risk taking for choices 
framed as gains versus losses).  For a discussion of how to select sample size for an experiment, see generally 
John A. List et al., So You Want to Run an Experiment, Now What? Some Simple Rules of Thumb for Optimal 
Experimental Design 7–12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15701, 2010). 
 68 See Devah Pager, The Use of Field Experiments for Studies of Employment Discrimination: 
Contributions, Critiques, and Directions for the Future, 609 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 104, 105, 
125 (2007) (discussing the use of field experiments to detect patterns of discrimination).  Such studies are 
often called “audit studies” within academic research.  Id. at 109. 
 69 Id. at 109–10. 
 70 Id. at 111–12. 
 71 Id. at 110–11. 
 72 Id. at 112. 
 73 See id. at 109 (“In the case of employment discrimination, two main types of audit studies offer useful 
approaches: correspondence tests and in-person audits.”).  Where a single potential defendant is the target of 
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Another common social fact experiment occurs in trademark disputes 
where the researcher tests for the effects of source confusion on consumer 
purchases.  In one case of alleged consumer confusion between two brands of 
non-cola soda, people entering a store were given a coupon for fifty cents off 
any brand of soda, with the exception of cola-flavored soda, to encourage them 
to purchase one of the products involved in the dispute.74  After checking out 
and paying for their purchases, consumers were asked by the researchers if 
they had used the coupon they had received, and each consumer who answered 
yes was then asked, “What brands of six-pack 12-ounce cans of non-alcoholic 
beverage other than cola flavor did you buy?”75  The researchers recorded the 
consumers’ answers and then compared them with the actual brands of soda in 
their shopping bags.76 
Sometimes a social fact experiment will be designed simply to reject the 
null hypothesis of a chance relationship between two variables without directly 
testing for the cause of any nonrandom relationship, as with the experiment 
conducted in the case of James Newsome.77  After being cleared of a murder 
conviction on actual innocence grounds fifteen years after being imprisoned, 
Mr. Newsome filed a civil rights action against the City of Chicago and its 
three police officers who allegedly induced three witnesses to falsely identify 
Newsome as the assailant in a murder case.78  To support his argument that the 
police did not use fair lineup procedures and encouraged witnesses to identify 
him falsely, Newsome retained Dr. Gary Wells, an expert on eyewitness 
identifications, to conduct an experiment on the likelihood that three 
individuals would select Newsome over the alleged true perpetrator, Dennis 
Emerson, from a pictorial lineup containing both men: 
[Wells] showed two panels of subjects different pictures of Emerson 
for 15 seconds then, after some time had passed, showed them 
pictures of the men in the lineup and asked them to choose the one 
 
inquiry, multiple tester applications (in person or by mail) to different locations or managers or by a variety of 
matched testers will be necessary to establish a pattern.  Id. at 125. 
 74 Squirt Co. v. Seven-Up Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 12, 24 (E.D. Mo. 1979). 
 75 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 76 Id.  The consumers were asked, “May I see the six-pack(s) of [each brand] you bought?  I know it is an 
inconvenience to unpack your groceries so I will give you a $3.00 gift certificate good on any purchase of 
$3.00 or more at this store through July 30th if you will show me the six-pack(s) you bought.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 77 Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301, 306 (7th Cir. 2003) (permitting the introduction of a chi-square 
analysis to calculate the probability of three eyewitnesses independently committing chance effort in a lineup 
identification). 
 78 Id. at 302. 
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they had seen in the initial photograph.  Of 50 members on the first 
panel, none selected Newsome’s photo; of 500 members on the 
second panel (which was shown a different photo of Emerson), 15 
chose Newsome’s photo.  Performing a chi-square test, Wells 
calculated that the probability of all three eyewitnesses independently 
picking Newsome out of a lineup by chance error was substantially 
less than one in 1,000, implying that the officers must have 
manipulated their identifications.79 
The appellate court upheld the district court’s admission of the results of 
Wells’s experiment, noting that the experiment yielded relevant information 
despite its failure to test for the causal influence of the police on 
identifications: 
Chicago does not contend that there was a better way to find out 
whether [the witnesses] would have identified Newsome without the 
coaching.  Instead it insists that Wells’ testimony was irrelevant 
because he did not determine how the witnesses had been induced to 
believe that they saw Newsome commit the murder.  Yet testimony 
need not prove everything in order to be useful.  As we have said, the 
jury had to consider the possibility that unhappy chance rather than 
malfeasance led to the mistaken conviction.  Wells provided 
information valuable in this endeavor.80 
Several alternatives to experiments exist for testing case-specific 
hypotheses.  We have already mentioned the most common means of testing 
hypotheses in employment cases: statistical analyses of applicant or employee 
records.81  Hypotheses can also be tested using observational studies82 or using 
qualitative data from case records by systematically coding the records (or a 
sample of the records) according to a predetermined protocol designed to 
identify and categorize or measure instances of the variables of interest.83 
The point that social fact studies can be performed on existing documentary 
evidence and thus do not require the collection of new data deserves emphasis.  
Unlike the physical sciences, much social science data begins as qualitative 
 
 79 Id. at 305–06. 
 80 Id. at 306. 
 81 See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
 82 See West, supra note 67, at 302–03 (discussing the ways in which observational studies allow 
researchers to assess causal effect). 
 83 See Laura A. King, Measures and Meanings: The Use of Qualitative Data in Social and Personality 
Psychology, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF METHODS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 173, 178–89 (Carol Sansone et 
al. eds., 2004) (discussing considerations of framing, designing, recruiting, coding, and interpreting in 
qualitative research). 
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data that is converted to quantitative data or is otherwise systematized for 
descriptive or causal inference purposes.  Records available in litigation may 
present a rich qualitative data source that can be systematically reviewed using 
reliable qualitative and quantitative social science techniques.84  Thus, it is 
never the case that the litigation context necessitates reliance on “expert 
judgment” in the guise of “social framework analysis” as the means of linking 
social science to a particular case.  If data cannot be analyzed reliably using 
qualitative or quantitative methods (due, say, to concerns about bias in the 
selection of case records), then no scientifically reliable inferences can be 
drawn from the data.  “Social framework analysis” cannot render inadequate 
data adequate. 
II. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SOCIAL FACTS 
Because social facts involve the application of social scientific techniques 
to a particular case, social facts are typically introduced through an expert 
witness who conducted or oversaw the social fact research.  That means the 
expert’s opinions must satisfy the threshold requirements for admissibility, 
which in federal court are: (1) that the opinions help the factfinder understand 
other evidence in the case or determine a fact at issue; (2) that the opinions be 
based on sufficient data and reliable methods; and (3) that the opinions apply 
reliably to the facts of the case.85  Social fact studies, if properly conceived to 
shed light on the issues in dispute in a particular case, should satisfy the 
helpfulness requirement because social fact studies generate useful information 
that the factfinder would otherwise lack.86  Social fact studies, if properly 
performed, should likewise satisfy the scientific reliability and fit 
requirements87 because social fact studies, by definition, involve the 
 
 84 For an extended discussion of the use of qualitative data for scientific inference purposes, see KING ET 
AL., supra note 40. 
 85 FED. R. EVID. 702.  Rule 702 was amended “in response to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and to the many cases applying Daubert.”  Id. advisory committee’s note. 
 86 See supra Part I.B (discussing how social fact studies provide descriptive information, explain the 
occurrence of behaviors, and test hypotheses). 
 87 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (“[A]ll scientific testimony or evidence . . . [must be] not only relevant, 
but reliable.”); id. at 591 (“Rule 702 further requires that the evidence or testimony ‘assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.’  This condition goes primarily to relevance. . . .  The 
consideration has been aptly described by Judge Becker as one of ‘fit.’  ‘Fit’ is not always obvious, and 
scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.” (citation 
omitted) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702 and United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985))).  
Social-science-based evidence equivalent to what we call social facts was admitted prior to Daubert on 
grounds that such evidence was helpful to a jury and, sometimes, on the additional grounds that the expert 
used generally accepted principles or methods to reach her case-specific opinions.  For example, before 
MITCHELL GALLEYSFINAL 6/6/2011  10:32 AM 
2011] BEYOND CONTEXT 1129 
application of reliable social science principles and techniques to the facts of a 
particular case. 
The reliability and fit requirements for expert opinions parallel scientific 
concerns with the internal and external validity of a study’s findings.88  
Examining research for internal validity involves asking “whether the methods 
and analyses employed were sound enough to justify the inferences drawn by 
the researcher.”89  Examining research for external validity involves asking 
“whether the inferences drawn from the study can be applied to groups beyond 
those actually studied.”90  As we discuss in the succeeding sections, whereas 
social fact studies raise special concerns about internal validity due to the 
possible contamination of results from the associated litigation, such studies 
 
Daubert, statistical evidence was typically examined just for relevance and prejudice and was not barred by 
Frye’s general acceptance standard.  See DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON 
EVIDENCE § 11.3.1, at 371 (2004) (discussing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).  And 
psychiatric assessments, if subjected to any special scrutiny at all, see id. § 7.8.2, at 270, usually survived 
scrutiny so long as generally accepted principles or procedures served as the basis for the opinion.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Gould, 741 F.2d 45, 49–50 (4th Cir. 1984) (“[W]henever an insanity defense is sought to be 
raised by the proffer of evidence of a newly-identified mental ‘disease or defect,’ the proffered evidence is 
relevant for the purpose only if there is shown to be substantial acceptance within the relevant discipline of the 
general hypothesis that the disorder may deprive some persons of the substantial capacity either to appreciate 
the wrongfulness of the particular conduct in issue or to conform their conduct to the particular requirements 
of law in issue.”), superseded by statute, Insanity Defense Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 
(1984), as recognized in United States v. Worrell, 313 F.3d 867, 872 (4th Cir. 2002).  After Daubert, the 
admission of properly performed social fact studies should not be in question on scientific reliability or fit 
grounds, even if the social fact study involves a novel application of social scientific principles or methods.  
Such an approach could well be barred under the Frye standard, however.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Crews, 
640 A.2d 395, 402 (Pa. 1994) (“[I]t is the conclusions to be drawn from the statistical information accumulated 
to date regarding DNA matches that has not achieved widespread acceptance within the scientific 
community. . . .  Therefore the trial court properly refused to entertain statistical information regarding the 
match.  The expert, however, was permitted to testify that the match of three out of four loci made it more 
probable than not that the sperm was that of the defendant.  This type of expert opinion testimony does not 
violate Frye, and thus was properly admitted.”). 
 88 See, e.g., JOHN BREWER & ALBERT HUNTER, MULTIMETHOD RESEARCH 158 (Sage Library of Soc. 
Research 175, 1989) (“Research to generate and test causal hypotheses is usually judged in terms of two 
standards: internal and external validity.”). 
 89 MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 2, at 68; accord THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, 
QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN & ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD SETTINGS 37 (1979) (“Internal validity 
refers to the approximate validity with which we infer that a relationship between two variables is causal or 
that the absence of a relationship implies the absence of cause.”); ROBERT M. LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL 
METHODS IN LAW 36 (2010).  (“Internal validity refers specifically to the extent to which the research design 
allows the drawing of valid inferences about the relationships between variables.”). 
 90 MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 2, at 68–69; accord COOK & CAMPBELL, supra note 89, at 37 
(“External validity refers to the approximate validity with which we can infer that the presumed causal 
relationship can be generalized to and across alternate measures of the cause and effect and across different 
types of persons, settings, and times.”). 
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will also tend to have greater external validity for the case at hand than general 
social science studies. 
A. Internal Validity 
Different methods and datasets pose different internal validity concerns, but 
standard solutions exist for many of these problems.91  Rather than discuss 
threats to internal validity generally,92 we focus here on two special concerns 
that may arise due to the litigation context in which social fact studies occur: 
biased expert witnesses and contamination from the associated litigation.  As 
we explain, expert witness bias presents no greater concerns for social fact 
testimony than other types of case-specific testimony, and we then discuss a 
variety of ways of dealing with data contamination concerns.93 
1. Bias 
As with any form of expert testimony,94 social fact studies present potential 
problems of expert bias and overclaiming.  However, the influence of expert 
biases and pressure from lawyers to give favorable opinions should pose less 
of a problem for social fact testimony than other forms of social-science-based 
testimony that go beyond simply reporting on research performed for purely 
academic purposes95 because an essential requirement for internal validity is 
 
 91 For example, although intentional and unintentional destruction of records is a concern for any social 
fact study, the problem of missing data is not new to social science research.  See Daniel A. Newman, Missing 
Data Techniques and Low Response Rates: The Role of Systematic Nonresponse Parameters, in STATISTICAL 
AND METHODOLOGICAL MYTHS AND URBAN LEGENDS: DOCTRINE, VERITY AND FABLE IN THE 
ORGANIZATIONAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 7, 8 (Charles E. Lance & Robert J. Vandenberg eds., 2009) (noting 
the difficulties faced by a data analyst when sampled individuals do not respond to a survey or survey item).  A 
variety of methods exist for dealing with this problem and estimating the impact of the missing data on study 
conclusions.  See id. at 12 tbl.1.2 (identifying the three levels of missing data and the corresponding data-
analytic methods for handling each). 
 92 For such a discussion, see MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 2, at 68–72. 
 93 Our focus here is on issues that may affect the internal validity of a social fact.  In Part III below, we 
deal with questions of legal access to the data needed for a social fact study and the ethics of conducting social 
fact studies. 
 94 See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1231 (“Expert testimony is a 
sizeable cottage industry that is geared entirely to provide effective partisan evidence.”). 
 95 Of course, many researchers expect their academic work to have applied purposes and undertake 
academic research to try to influence public policy debates.  Thus, the academic-purpose/litigation-purpose 
distinction may adhere to an idealistic view of pure scientific research that is hard to find in practice.  See 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995) (“One very significant fact to be 
considered is whether the experts are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of 
research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions 
expressly for purposes of testifying.  That an expert testifies for money does not necessarily cast doubt on the 
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that the researcher document the steps taken with sufficient detail for another 
researcher to replicate her results.96  Indeed, one of the strongest points in favor 
of social facts, compared to “social framework analysis,” is transparency in the 
process whereby social facts were formed.  If an expert cannot present the data 
and methods that led to social fact opinions in a particular instance for another 
social scientist to review, then the social fact fails to meet reliability 
requirements.97 
2. Contamination 
A more serious threat to the internal validity of a social fact study is that 
ongoing or threatened litigation may somehow alter the behavior of those 
being observed.  For instance, in EEOC v. Dial Corp., a researcher retained by 
the EEOC administered a questionnaire to assess whether a hostile work 
environment existed within the defendant corporation.98  Potential respondents 
included a number of plaintiff class members, and respondents were notified of 
the study’s purpose but were told that their responses would be confidential.99  
The defendant moved to exclude expert testimony based on the questionnaire, 
and the court ruled that, among other problems with the study, apparent bias in 
responses made the questionnaire results unreliable.100 
Where there are valid concerns that participant confidentiality or 
anonymity will not remove the threat of litigation contamination, alternative 
approaches should be taken to minimize this threat.  One alternative is to 
employ nonreactive methods (e.g., analysis of archival records, computer 
simulations, or truly unobtrusive observational studies where the fact of 
 
reliability of his testimony, as few experts appear in court merely as an eleemosynary gesture.  But in 
determining whether proposed expert testimony amounts to good science, we may not ignore the fact that a 
scientist’s normal workplace is the lab or the field, not the courtroom or the lawyer’s office.  That an expert 
testifies based on research he has conducted independent of the litigation provides important, objective proof 
that the research comports with the dictates of good science.” (footnote omitted)). 
 96 See Gregory Mitchell, Empirical Legal Scholarship as Scientific Dialogue, 83 N.C. L. REV. 167, 176 
(2004) (noting the ability of intersubjective testing and review to increase objectivity of empirical research). 
 97 See Monahan et al., Limits of Social Frameworks, supra note 5, at 315–17 (discussing the scientific 
requirement that the bases for a researcher’s inferences be made public). 
 98 No. CIV.A. 99-C-3356, 2002 WL 31061088, at *1–3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2002). 
 99 Id. at *4–5. 
 100 Id. at *9 (“[T]he inclusion of a large number of class members in the survey appears to have strongly 
influenced the overall results, which further supports the defendant’s position that the survey data do not 
reliably reflect the views or experiences of the overall population of relevant employees.”). 
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observation is not apparent).101  Another is to employ a design that studies 
third parties rather than the parties to the lawsuit. 
Yet another option, where the parties or their agents need to serve as 
participants, is to conduct the study in such a way as to conceal the fact of the 
study or at least the study’s purpose, as is the case with tester studies, and if 
possible, to use persons who are blind to the study’s purpose to administer the 
study.102  A number of unobtrusive methods other than the tester study exist for 
measuring even such socially charged topics as racism and discrimination.  For 
instance, e-mail experiments can be conducted where the apparent race, 
ethnicity, or gender of the correspondent is systematically varied and responses 
to requests within the e-mails are measured.103  Or, an experiment can be 
embedded in an observational study, where the race or sex of an interacting 
partner is systematically varied and the interactions are recorded unobtrusively 
to test for disparate treatment.104 
A fourth alternative is to conduct a study with similarly situated persons 
who are not involved in the lawsuit.  This approach was employed in Whiteway 
v. FedEx Kinko’s Office and Print Services, Inc., a wage-and-hour class action 
covering center managers employed in California.105  Because agents of the 
defendant were not supposed to have contact with class members, an expert for 
the defendant conducted a study of the exempt and nonexempt duties 
performed by a sample of branch managers in other western states.106  This 
 
 101 See, e.g., Jerry M. Newman, Discrimination in Recruitment: An Empirical Analysis, 32 INDUS. & LAB. 
REL. REV. 15, 17 (1978) (distributing fictitious résumés to employers unaware of the experiment to assess 
racial dimensions of their employment decisions). 
 102 See, e.g., Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (double-blind 
study of blend users with respect to their manner of use of stir stick in patent infringement case); Marlo v. 
UPS, Inc., No. CV 03-04336DDP(RZX), 2005 WL 6197774, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2005) (double-blind 
survey of employees regarding their duties in wage-and-hour case). 
 103 See, e.g., Brad J. Bushman & Angelica M. Bonacci, You’ve Got Mail: Using E-mail to Examine the 
Effect of Prejudiced Attitudes on Discrimination Against Arabs, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 753, 758 
(2004) (“The current study used a novel procedure, the lost e-mail technique, to demonstrate that prejudiced 
individuals discriminate against Arabs when they can remain anonymous.”). 
 104 See, e.g., Samuel L. Gaertner et al., Race of Victim, Nonresponsive Bystanders, and Helping Behavior, 
117 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 69, 73–77 (1982) (assessing how a victim’s race and the presence of bystanders 
impacted not just the decision to help, but also latency and heart rate measures). 
 105 No. C 05-2320 SBA, 2007 WL 2408872, *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2007), rev’d, 319 F. App’x 688 
(9th Cir. 2009). 
 106 Id. at *8.  The plaintiff challenged the study on grounds that it did not examine the activities of the 
actual class members (which is an external validity challenge on the basis of participants’ characteristics, a 
topic we address below), but the court rejected this challenge: “FedEx argues, and Whiteway does not 
effectively rebut, that there is no operational/functional difference between the centers in California and the 
centers in other western states surveyed.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
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approach should be possible in any large organization where similarly situated 
teams, units, or branches can be observed or assigned to different conditions of 
a study.107 
Yet another possible check on demand effects arising from participant 
knowledge of the lawsuit would be the inclusion within each study condition 
of a subgroup of participants who are expressly told that the study is connected 
to the lawsuit.  This would allow researchers to examine whether such 
knowledge leads to differences in behavior within any of the conditions.  
Whether the added cost and complexity of such an added condition are 
warranted will depend on the nature of the study and the likelihood of response 
bias in the event the study’s connection to the lawsuit is suspected.  To prevent 
interference by a party or employees of a party, efforts should be made to limit 
knowledge of the study or its purposes to a small control group.  In cases of 
severe concern, checks for party interference could be built into the study (e.g., 
use of confederates within the participant pool or misinformation to the 
company about what effects would be expected to vindicate a party’s theory of 
the case to check for potential managerial tampering).108 
Given these solutions, social fact studies should not be dismissed out of 
hand on grounds of contamination from the associated litigation, as some have 
done.109  The potential influence of the researcher and research setting on 
 
 107 See, e.g., id. at *9 (“[T]here remains no evidence[] that . . . the job duties/responsibilities of any Center 
Manager . . . are any different than another.”). 
 108 See, e.g., Cara Laney et al., The Red Herring Technique: A Methodological Response to the Problem 
of Demand Characteristics, 72 PSYCHOL. RES. 362, 364 (2008) (“The Red Herring technique allows naturally 
curious subjects to ‘figure out’ what the study is about without actually figuring out what the study is about 
(and thus becoming subject to demand). . . .  [I]t is applicable to a wide range of studies in psychology, 
especially those involving deception.”); id. (“The Red Herring is an extra layer of information (separate from 
both what subjects were told and what we were actually studying), intended to provide a plausible explanation 
for the tasks subjects are asked to complete.  That is, we are doubly deceiving subjects.”). 
 109 Tuli v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d 208, 214 (D. Mass. 2009) (“While one could 
attempt to perform [case-specific] tests, their scientific integrity would be fatally compromised when 
conducted within the context of a lawsuit against those individuals or the corporation that employs them.  
Social scientific research into the basic principles of sex stereotyping normally involves voluntary participants 
who are assured (and can rely on these assurances) of the complete anonymity and confidentiality of their 
responses.  It is unlikely that researchers could obtain candid and uncensored self-reports of attitudes from 
employees who are aware that the research is related to a pending lawsuit against the organization that 
employs them.  Thus, concerns about scientific validity . . . do not recommend mounting an organizational 
investigation using standard social science techniques.” (quoting expert report of Dr. Peter Glick)); Jennifer S. 
Hunt et al., Scientific Status, in 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT 
TESTIMONY § 18:14 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2008) (“In addition, the argument that contract research is 
the appropriate method of determining whether gender stereotyping occurred ignores several important 
limitations of conducting such research.  One serious problem with the contract approach is that there is no 
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results is a pervasive problem in the behavioral sciences.110  Thus, the question 
is not whether an expert who seeks to apply social science to a particular case 
should rely on general social science studies possessing no potential demand 
characteristics or social fact studies possessing potential demand 
characteristics.  Rather, the question is whether adequate protections were 
taken against demand effects in whatever research forms the basis for the 
opinions.  We see no reason to expect demand effects to threaten findings from 
social fact studies any more than many other academic studies, where the 
participants often know they are being studied and often know the general 
purpose of the study before any behaviors are measured.  Where such threats 
exist, the researcher should take precautions to minimize the risks of 
contamination whatever the research setting. 
B. External Validity 
While internal validity threats may be greater for some social fact studies 
due to the litigation connection, concerns about external validity threats will 
actually be lower precisely because the study is tailored to address questions 
specific to the litigation.  Where the parties themselves are studied or case-
specific data is analyzed using social science tools, the superior fit of social 
facts to findings from generic social science studies is obvious.  But as we have 
discussed, not every social fact study will be a direct test of case-specific 
hypotheses using case-specific data.111  In some cases, the social fact study 
may simulate the conditions involved in the litigation or seek to gather relevant 
information from third parties via surveys or experiments.112  In these cases, 
degree of fit can be assessed along five dimensions that social scientists 
commonly consider the determinants of external validity: (1) the independent 
variables studied; (2) the dependent variables measured; (3) the persons 
 
way of determining the extent to which employees’ responses will be tainted by knowledge of the litigation 
underway, the sponsors of the survey, or the potential ramifications of their responses.  It is likely that 
employees will try to give unbiased responses, even if they are not accurate.  Moreover, research indicates that 
gender stereotyping often occurs outside of conscious awareness, so even if employees are completely honest, 
their responses may not reveal the actual occurrence of gender stereotyping.” (footnote omitted)). 
 110 See, e.g., Austin Lee Nichols & Jon K. Maner, The Good-Subject Effect: Investigating Participant 
Demand Characteristics, 135 J. GEN. PSYCHOL. 151, 151 (2008) (“Researchers are often concerned with the 
presence of demand characteristics, cues that make participants aware of what the experimenter expects to find 
or how participants are expected to behave, and the researchers typically use methods for reducing the 
demand.”). 
 111 See supra Part I.B.1–2. 
 112 See supra Part I.B.1–2. 
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studied; (4) the settings studied; and (5) the time frame studied.113  If a change 
along one of these dimensions would lead to a change in the behaviors or 
causal relations observed before the change, then the study’s findings will not 
be externally valid for the changed domain.114 
A researcher designing a social fact study should be conscious of 
differences between the study and the case at hand lest the study’s results be 
deemed inadmissible on lack of fit grounds.115  A judge considering the fit of 
research to the case should ask whether surface differences between the case 
facts and research design are meaningful differences that render inferences 
from the research misleading or inapplicable. 
1. Independent Variables: Do the Hypothesized Causal Variables in the 
Research Approximate the Causal Variables in the Plaintiff’s and 
Defendant’s Theories of the Case? 
The significance of the choice of independent variables to the external 
validity of a social fact study is apparent.  If the expert fails to study the 
variables hypothesized by the parties to have caused or contributed to the 
outcomes in the case, then the social fact study will not fit the facts of the case.  
For instance, in a gender discrimination case based on a failure to hire, the 
independent variable under the plaintiff’s theory of the case may be applicant 
sex, whereas the defendant may argue that applicant qualifications caused the 
outcome in the case.116  Thus, for a social fact study of gender discrimination 
 
 113 See, e.g., LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 89, at 410 (defining external validity as the extent to which 
findings can be generalized to different people, settings, times, and measures); Marilynn B. Brewer, Research 
Design and Issues of Validity, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY 
PSYCHOLOGY 3, 4 (Harry T. Reis & Charles M. Judd eds., 2000) (“External validity . . . refer[s] to the 
generalizability of the causal finding, that is, whether it can be concluded that the same cause–effect 
relationship would be obtained across different subjects, settings, and methods.”); T. D. Cook, Generalization: 
Conceptions in the Social Sciences, in 9 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCES 6037, 6037 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes et al. eds., 2001) (“[S]ocial scientists typically draw 
conclusions about four not completely independent entities—human populations, physical settings, causes, and 
observables . . . .  Time, understood as historical period, might also be added.”). 
 114 See Cook, supra note 113, at 6037 (noting the threats to external validity posed by extrapolating 
findings to different age groups, geographic areas, and institutional settings). 
 115 See, e.g., Cnty. of Kenosha v. C & S Mgmt., Inc., 588 N.W.2d 236, 253–54 (Wis. 1999) (excluding 
survey of community views in an obscenity trial where “the innocuous description of the types of activities the 
survey respondent was to consider [wa]s too far removed from the graphic scenes of sexual activity in [the 
videotape in question] to be relevant on the question of whether that particular video is obscene”). 
 116 In most such cases, sex will be treated as a dichotomous independent variable (i.e., with the categories 
male versus female), but in cases where failure to conform to gender stereotypes is the basis for a sex 
discrimination claim, degree of fit with gender stereotypes might be the proper independent variable. 
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to be externally valid on the independent variable dimension in this case, the 
study must examine the impact of applicant sex and qualifications on 
employment outcomes.117 
To be externally valid, the independent variable need not perfectly mirror 
the variable alleged to be the direct cause of harm to the plaintiff or alleged to 
provide an excuse for the defendant’s conduct.  For instance, in the pictorial 
lineup experiment conducted in the Newsome case,118 the appellate court 
upheld the district court’s admission of the experimental results despite surface 
differences between the case and the experiment: 
Experiments of the kind that Wells performed are the norm in this 
branch of science and have met the standard for scholarly publication 
and acceptance.  There were of course potential problems.  For 
example, Wells assumed that Emerson is the killer, so that the 
witnesses saw him; if anyone other than Emerson committed the 
murder, the test is invalid.  Wells was candid about this vital 
assumption, which was open to probing and argument by the 
defendants.  Wells also assumed that two-dimensional images 
(pictures) yield the same effects on memory as three-dimensional 
views (live action in the victim’s grocery store; lineups in the police 
station; identifications in open court).  This may or may not hold, but 
the claim of equivalence was open to exploration at trial, and it is 
hard to see what else Wells could have done.  Even if he could have 
conscripted Emerson and the lineup participants for an experiment, 
time has so altered their appearance since the events of October 1979 
that the results would have been unreliable. . . .  Yet testimony need 
not prove everything in order to be useful. . . .  Wells’ testimony was 
not a distraction in this civil proceeding but went to an important 
ingredient of the plaintiff’s claim.119 
2. Dependent Variables: Are the Outcomes Studied in the Research Similar 
to the Outcomes at Issue in the Litigation? 
Deciding on the proper dependent variable for a social fact study will be 
straightforward in many cases, as in a failure-to-hire case where the fact of 
hiring (or not) is the proper dependent measure in a statistical analysis of 
 
 117 An expert may choose to test only one of the independent variables, in which case the study will be 
externally valid but its statistical conclusion and internal validities are threatened by the failure to control for a 
third variable that could explain or affect the covariation between the independent and dependent variables 
studied. 
 118 See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text. 
 119 Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301, 306 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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applicant data or another form of social fact study.  In some cases, the ultimate 
legal question of interest may be more difficult to operationalize.  For instance, 
in Lanham Act cases, in which social fact studies are frequently used,120 the 
key legal question is whether consumers or potential consumers are likely to be 
confused by two specific products or services.121  Turning this question into a 
testable proposition may be more difficult than it seems.122  For example, 
answers to a survey question that asks, “What is the first thing that comes to 
mind when looking at [the allegedly infringing trademark]?,” have been 
uniformly deemed inadmissible because “calling to mind” differs from 
“likelihood of confusion.”123  As Judge Rich observed: 
The very fact of calling to mind may indicate that the mind is 
distinguishing, rather than being confused by, two marks. . . .  Seeing 
a yellow traffic light immediately “calls to mind” the green that has 
gone and the red that is to come, or vice versa; that does not mean 
that confusion is being caused.  As we are conditioned, it means 
exactly the opposite.124 
Similarly, a study investigating if the Ghostbusters movie logo is 
“reminiscent” of the Casper, the Friendly Ghost character does not provide 
sufficient evidence that audiences will be confused about whether the movie 
logo and cartoon character have a common source.125  “[I]f the survey 
questions are not congruent with the issues in the case, the results will not only 
 
 120 See SIEGRUN D. KANE, TRADEMARK LAW § 16:6, at 16-14 (PLI Intellectual Prop. Law Library No. 
G1-8804, 4th ed. 2006) (“The judicial attitude toward surveys has moved 180 degrees in past decades.  While 
many courts used to exclude survey evidence as inadmissible hearsay or give it little weight, surveys are now 
generally looked on as significant evidence.”); supra note 16 (discussing the use of surveys in trademark 
cases). 
 121 Squirt Co. v. Seven-Up Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 12, 19 (E.D. Mo. 1979). 
 122 Framing the question properly can be seen as a problem of both external validity and construct 
validity.  “Construct validity involves making inferences from the sampling particulars of a study to the 
higher-order constructs they represent.”  WILLIAM R. SHADISH ET AL., EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR GENERALIZED CAUSAL INFERENCE 65 (Kathi Prancan ed., 2002). 
Construct validity and external validity are related to each other in two ways.  First, both are 
generalizations. . . .  Second, valid knowledge of the constructs that are involved in a study can 
shed light on external validity questions, especially if a well-developed theory exists that 
describes how various constructs and instances are related to each other. 
Id. at 93. 
 123 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:176, at 32-
375 to -376 (4th ed. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 124 In re Ferrero, 479 F.2d 1395, 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
 125 Harvey Cartoons v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1564, 1573 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
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be irrelevant, but may also be prejudicially misleading to a jury . . . .”126  The 
risk of wasting resources due to an ill-conceived dependent variable argues 
strongly for the social fact expert to work closely with the attorneys to ensure 
that the study examines proper variables. 
3. Persons: Are the Research Participants Similar to the Persons Involved 
in the Case? 
Under the Lanham Act, potential confusion only matters for the 
“consumers and potential consumers” of the products or services in 
question.127  It is not surprising, therefore, that an initial task in designing 
social fact research for use in trademark litigation is to determine the universe 
of people whose level of confusion is to be estimated.128  “Selection of the 
proper universe is a crucial step, for even if the proper questions are asked in a 
proper manner, if the wrong persons are asked, the results are likely to be 
irrelevant.”129 
 
 126 MCCARTHY, supra note 123, § 32:170, at 32-351; accord Starter Corp. v. Converse, Inc., 170 F.3d 
286, 297 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that it was proper for district court to exclude research because the survey 
questions were “little more than a memory test” and, therefore, were not probative of the likelihood of 
confusion); J & J Snack Foods, Corp. v. Earthgrains Co., 220 F. Supp. 2d 358, 370 (D.N.J. 2002) (“Above all, 
the survey’s design must fit the issue which is to be decided by the jury, and not some inaccurate restatement 
of the issue, lest the survey findings inject confusion or inappropriate definitions into evidence, confounding 
rather than assisting the jury.”); Franklin Res., Inc. v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp., 988 F. Supp. 322, 335 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Surveys which do nothing more than demonstrate the respondents’ ability to read are not 
probative on the issue of likelihood of consumer confusion.”); Jacob Jacoby, Survey and Field Experimental 
Evidence, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 175, 186 (Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. 
Wrightsman eds., 1985) (“[C]ourts raise two points regarding the questions posed to respondents: (1) Do these 
questions address the legal issues that are relevant to the case?  (2) If so, are the questions posed in a clear and 
unbiased manner?”). 
 127 See, e.g., Sizes Unlimited, Inc. v. Sizes to Fit, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1558, 1561 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) 
(“Consumers and potential consumers of a product must, on the basis of the mark at issue, associate the goods 
or services at issue with a single source, even if that source is anonymous.”). 
 128 MCCARTHY, supra note 123, § 32:159, at 32-319. 
 129 Id.; accord Robert C. Bird, Streamlining Consumer Survey Analysis: An Examination of the Concept 
of Universe in Consumer Surveys Offered in Intellectual Property Litigation, 88 TRADEMARK REP. 269, 276–
77 (1998) (“Determination of the universe represents one of the most significant challenges a survey expert 
will face in drafting a consumer survey.  A misaligned universe can doom otherwise competent research and 
trigger an adverse decision by the court.”); Shari Seidman Diamond, Survey Research, in 1 MODERN 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 109, § 8:10 (“One of the first steps in designing a survey or in deciding 
whether an existing survey is relevant is to identify the target population (or universe).”); Lawrence E. Evans, 
Jr. & David M. Gunn, Trademark Surveys, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 1, 31 (1989) (“Errors in [selecting the 
universe] are more likely to prove fatal than errors in the content of the questions, for there is some value in a 
slanted question asked of the right witness, but no value in asking the right question of the wrong witness.”); 
Jacoby, supra note 126, at 179–80 (“It has become axiomatic in trademark case law that the key consideration 
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The precise population of consumers or potential consumers whose 
confusion is at issue in a given trademark dispute, of course, will vary 
according to the types of products or services being purchased.130  For 
example, in one case, the proper population for a survey relating to confusion 
between fishing reels was persons over fourteen years who had fished in fresh 
water in the prior twelve months.131  In another case, the proper population for 
a survey on confusion between prescription medications for glaucoma was 
found to be ophthalmologists and optometrists who, as the prescribers, “make 
the ultimate determination as to which medications pharmacists will dispense 
and end-users—patients—will receive.”132  In the landmark case of Zippo 
Manufacturing Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., involving dueling cigarette 
lighters, the relevant population was determined to be “all smokers aged 
eighteen years and older residing in the continental United States.”133 
A focus on the wrong population can be fatal.  In Amstar Corp. v. 
Domino’s Pizza, Inc., the researcher surveyed women at home during daylight 
hours.134  Responses from this sample were found to be inadequate for proving 
a likelihood of confusion between defendant’s Domino’s pizza restaurants and 
plaintiff’s Domino sugar because the defendant’s customers were mainly 
young, single, male college students, whereas the plaintiff’s customers were 
mainly middle-aged women.135  The women surveyed, having little exposure to 
Domino’s pizza trademark, were not the appropriate population for assessing 
confusion.136 
The risk of different results between participant samples extends to the 
general social science literature as well.  For example, consumer research 
involving student samples has been found to produce different results from 
research involving nonstudent samples in a number of respects.137  Thus, off-
 
in the design of a survey is whether the appropriate universe was tested.  More surveys are held inadmissible 
or given no weight for having employed an improper universe than for any other reason.” (citations omitted)). 
 130 See MCCARTHY, supra note 123, § 23:5, at 23-23 (“[C]ustomers may be consumers, professional 
purchasers or wholesalers or retailers.  A potential customer is one who might someday purchase this kind of 
product or service and pays attention to brands in that market.” (footnote omitted)). 
 131 Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 523 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987). 
 132 Pharmacia Corp. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 335, 365 (D.N.J. 2002). 
 133 216 F. Supp. 670, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
 134 615 F.2d 252, 264 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 See Robert A. Peterson, On the Use of College Students in Social Science Research: Insights from a 
Second-Order Meta-Analysis, 28 J. CONSUMER RES. 450, 458 (2001) (“[T]he present research suggests that, by 
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the-rack research, even if it directly addresses the independent and dependent 
variables implicated in a case, may lack external validity due to differences 
between the people studied and the relevant population for a case. 
The particular characteristics of individuals that will pose external validity 
threats differ by type of case.  For instance, in an obscenity case, the 
community from which the sample is drawn will be important.  In eyewitness 
identification studies, the race of participants will be important due to potential 
bias in same- versus other-race identifications.138  A particular concern with 
extrapolating from general social science research to a specific discrimination 
case, as happens when an expert performs “social framework analysis,” is that 
many subjects of personnel experiments possess little work experience and are 
less personally interested in or motivated to attend to the tasks at hand than 
actual job applicants, employees, and managers at many companies.139  
Further, these differences have been shown to affect the likelihood that bias 
will be observed in personnel decisions.140  A major advantage of a social fact 
study over “social framework analysis” is that social fact studies may include 
job applicants, employees, and managers drawn from the pool of persons 
involved in the case or persons matched on levels of education, experience, 
training, and demographic characteristics to the persons involved in the 
litigation.141 
 
relying on college student subjects, researchers may be constrained regarding what might be learned about 
consumer behavior and in certain instances may even be misinformed.”). 
 138 On differences in identifications by race, see Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years 
of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 3, 21 (2001). 
 139 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 140 See, e.g., Randall A. Gordon & Richard D. Arvey, Age Bias in Laboratory and Field Settings: A Meta-
Analytic Investigation, 34 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 468, 485–86 (2004) (“For the most part, the results from 
analyses that examined the issue of generalizability show that greater and more relevant information and 
greater and more relevant experience among raters, judges, or supervisors leads to less age bias.”); Cynthia M. 
Marlowe et al., Gender and Attractiveness Biases in Hiring Decisions: Are More Experienced Managers Less 
Biased?, 81 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 11, 18 (1996) (“Managers of all experience levels exhibited bias in the rating 
conditions, despite the fact that all of our applicant photographs were rated as being at least somewhat 
attractive. . . .  These biases tended to decrease as managerial experience increased, except that less attractive 
women were routinely judged to be the worst applicants.”); Dianna L. Stone et al., Methodological Problems 
Associated with Research on Unfair Discrimination Against Racial Minorities, 18 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 
REV. 243, 251 (2008) (“Interestingly, an analysis of the average effect size estimates revealed that studies 
using non-representative samples had a larger effect size (r = .24) than those using representative samples (r = 
.14).  These results suggest that race may have less of an effect on personnel decisions in actual organizational 
settings than in contrived settings.”). 
 141 See, e.g., supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text. 
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4. Setting: Are the Research Setting and Tasks Similar to Those in the 
Case? 
In trademark cases, the setting in which the social fact study has been 
conducted affects the admissibility of the study and its ability to persuade: 
“[T]he closer the survey methods mirror the situation in which the ordinary 
person would encounter the trademark, the greater the evidentiary weight of 
the survey results.”142  For example, in the case of alleged consumer confusion 
between two brands of non-cola soda where actual consumer behavior was 
observed,143 the court commented favorably on this market survey: 
[A]n actual purchaser is asked to list the brands he has just 
purchased, and then asked to display the brands he has named, in 
order to determine the accuracy of his listed purchases. . . .  [T]he fact 
that the survey was conducted in a live market environment and 
measured actual consumer purchasing behavior as opposed to being 
conducted in the home and measuring consumer opinion, lends 
greater reliability to the survey results.144 
Some courts have discounted or rejected surveys that did not reproduce the 
state of mind of consumers in an actual retail setting.  As Judge Wyzanski 
famously commented: 
If the interviewee is not in a buying mood but is just in a friendly 
mood answering a pollster, his degree of attention is quite different 
from what it would be had he his wallet in his hand.  Many men do 
not take the same trouble to avoid confusion when they are 
responding to sociological investigators as when they spend their 
cash.145 
Others, however, have taken the view that it is not necessary that a survey 
be administered only to people with wallet in hand in a live market 
environment.146  As Judge Feinberg stated in Zippo: 
While it may be that in general the store is the best place to measure 
the state of mind at the time of purchase, it would be virtually 
impossible to obtain a representative national sample if stores were 
 
 142 MCCARTHY, supra note 123, § 32:163, at 32-333; accord KANE, supra note 120, § 16:6.1, at 16-20 
(“The more remote the survey is from actual marketplace conditions, the less persuasive it will be.”). 
 143 See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. 
 144 Squirt Co. v. Seven-Up Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 12, 25–26 (E.D. Mo. 1979). 
 145 Am. Luggage Works, Inc. v. U.S. Trunk Co., 158 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D. Mass. 1957). 
 146 See MCCARTHY, supra note 123, § 32:163, at 32-334 (“To require that a survey be taken ‘during the 
buying decision’ is an impossible requirement tantamount to rejecting all survey evidence.”). 
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used.  An interview at a respondent’s home is probative of his state of 
mind at the time of purchase, although the deviation from the actual 
purchase situation should be considered in weighing the force of this 
evidence.147 
The setting dimension presents one of the strongest arguments for social 
fact studies in discrimination cases because it can be difficult to simulate the 
relevant conditions of a particular organization in a lab or to find another field 
setting that matches the defendant organization in key respects.  In post-hire 
discrimination cases (and many hiring cases), managers almost always have 
more personalized information about the employees (or applicants) in question 
and operate under stronger potential penalties for discrimination than, for 
example, college students playing the role of managers in laboratory 
simulations and making decisions about hypothetical or role-playing 
employees.  Importantly, both of these factors—degree and type of 
personalized knowledge and accountability pressures on decisionmakers—are 
known to moderate the likelihood that prejudicial attitudes or stereotypes will 
bias judgments or decisions about women or minorities, and a host of other 
organization-specific factors may dampen or magnify the prospect of unbiased 
decision making.148  Furthermore, local labor market conditions will likely 
impact how organizations hire, promote, and pay their employees; conditions 
within the industry and the region in which the organization is located may 
also impact employment practices.149 
 
 147 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (footnotes omitted). 
 148 See, e.g., Frank J. Landy, Stereotypes, Bias, and Personnel Decisions: Strange and Stranger, 1 INDUS. 
& ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 379, 380, 384 (2008) (noting the impact of adequate safeguards and 
individuating information on workplace discrimination); Philip E. Tetlock et al., The Challenge of Debiasing 
Personnel Decisions: Avoiding Both Under- and Overcorrection, 1 INDUS. & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 
439, 440 (2008) (finding empirical and theoretical support for the proposition that accountability pressures will 
push decisionmakers to value individuating over implicit biases).  See generally Philip E. Tetlock & Gregory 
Mitchell, Implicit Bias and Accountability Systems: What Must Organizations Do to Prevent Discrimination?, 
29 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 3, 11–18 (2009) (critiquing the argument that equal opportunity is 
impossible in a society with inequality of result). 
 149 For example, within the United States, racial biases are correlated with geographic region, income 
levels, and educational attainment.  See, e.g., Peter Burns & James G. Gimpel, Economic Insecurity, 
Prejudicial Stereotypes, and Public Opinion on Immigration Policy, 115 POL. SCI. Q. 201, 212–17 (2000) 
(discussing the impact of contextual and personal factors on racial attitudes in 1992 and 1996); cf. Nakajima v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 857 F. Supp. 100, 105 (D.D.C. 1994) (“Where, as here, the expert’s opinion is based on an 
incorrect assumption about the country in which a plaintiff will reside, the testimony should not be permitted 
because it fails to serve its purpose of aiding the trier of fact in its determination of lost future earnings.”); id. 
(“Additionally, plaintiff’s contention that the use of United States’ statistical and economic data is necessary 
because comparable Japanese data is not available is not supported by the record.  A review of [an expert’s] 
deposition and the Year Book of Labour Statistics, published by the Japanese Ministry of Labour, shows that 
adequate Japanese data on the factors considered under District of Columbia law exists.  Therefore, the 
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Findings from the lab based on college students making low-stakes or 
hypothetical decisions in limited interactions may yield important findings on 
basic cognitive and motivational processes involved in impression formation 
and intergroup behavior, but these findings may provide little guidance to the 
behaviors likely to be observed under the conditions of the real workplace 
involved in the case.  Accordingly, the ability of a social fact study to be 
customized to include particular job classifications, particular divisions in a 
firm, particular stores or factories owned by a firm, particular tasks, and 
particular processes, or to analyze existing case-specific data using systematic 
qualitative or quantitative techniques, presents a considerable advantage over 
“social framework analysis” and expert speculation about the relevance of 
studies conducted in the lab or in different organizational settings for the case 
at hand. 
5. Timing: Has Time Changed Anything? 
The time dimension will rarely pose a severe threat to the external validity 
of a social fact study in a civil case due to statutes of limitations that encourage 
plaintiffs to file their claims within a relatively short time of the challenged 
conduct.150  In contrast, “social framework analysis” may rely on general social 
science research conducted many years ago, meaning that temporal differences 
create a greater external validity risk: 
 
testimony of [the expert], insofar as it is based on a presumption of Nakajima’s future residence in the United 
States, is excluded.” (citation omitted)). 
 150 For instance, Title VII provides that charges of discrimination should be submitted to the EEOC within 
180 days of the alleged discrimination in states with no state agency devoted to handling discrimination claims 
or, in states with such agencies, within 300 days of the alleged discrimination or 30 days of termination of state 
agency proceedings (whichever date is earlier).  42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1) (2006).  Considerable time may 
pass, however, before the EEOC decides whether to pursue the case or issues a right-to-sue letter or between 
the start of a suit and involvement of an expert.  Plus, the continuing violation theory of discrimination may 
further widen the gap between the date of alleged discrimination and the filing of suit, or the plaintiff may seek 
to introduce evidence of discriminatory conduct outside the limitations period to support her case.  See Kyle 
Graham, The Continuing Violations Doctrine, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 271, 275 (2007/08) (“The first sort of 
continuing violation aggregates multiple allegedly wrongful acts, failures to act, or decisions such that the 
limitations period begins to run on this collected malfeasance only when the defendant ceases its improper 
conduct.  The second type of continuing violation divides what might otherwise represent a single, time-barred 
cause of action into several separate claims, at least one of which accrues within the limitations period prior to 
suit.” (footnote omitted)).  Thus, where there are concerns about memory or changes due to intervening events, 
the researcher should take these concerns into account and seek to examine the impact of this passage of time 
on any newly collected data.  See Barbara A. Gutek, My Experience as an Expert Witness in Sex 
Discrimination and Sexual Harassment Litigation, in SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 
45, at 131, 137 (“But given the long time frame of this case and many other class actions, it is important to find 
out when relevant behaviors occurred; surely it makes a difference if all objectionable behavior occurred more 
than five years ago or if the amount of potentially harassing behavior increased over time.”). 
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At some point, many social research findings—no matter how valid 
at the time they were obtained—can be criticized as being outdated or 
“stale.”  They no longer reflect the current situation.  A study finding 
massive discrimination against women in law schools in the 1950’s, 
for example, may not be generalizable as evidence in a Title VII suit 
against a law school in the 2000’s.151 
The crucial question on the temporal dimension will be whether significant 
organizational, societal, political, or other events intervened between the date 
of the contested conduct and the date of the study, raising concerns about 
generalizing backwards in time.152  For instance, perhaps the organization 
instituted new managerial training or oversight after the lawsuit was filed that 
sensitized managers to problems of workplace discrimination (or at least to the 
risk of misbehavior detection).  If so, use of a social fact method that involves 
systematic analysis of historical case records, rather than an observational or 
field study that focuses on current relations or behavior, may be more 
appropriate. 
III.  LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN SOCIAL FACT STUDIES 
All social fact studies occur in a context of general legal rules, and the 
opportunity to investigate a case using social fact research depends, finally, on 
this context.  In this Part, we describe the different contexts in which research 
may occur to identify legal and ethical issues in each.  We adopt as our central 
organizing variable the timing of the research in relation to the filing of suit 
because different concerns arise between prefiling and postfiling research.  We 
also distinguish between research on one of the parties or their representatives 
and research on third parties.  Our goals are to suggest judicial interpretations 
 
 151 MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 2, at 74.  Research has found that the likelihood of finding age bias 
in personnel decisions decreased over the last generation.  Gordon & Arvey, supra note 140, at 479.  Likewise, 
gender and racial attitudes have liberalized considerably over the last fifty years.  See, e.g., Lawrence D. Bobo 
& Camille Z. Charles, Race in the American Mind: From the Moynihan Report to the Obama Candidacy, 621 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 243, 245 (2009) (“Overall, . . . these improvements in whites’ racial 
attitudes are sweeping and robust . . . .”); Clem Brooks & Catherine Bolzendahl, The Transformation of US 
Gender Role Attitudes: Cohort Replacement, Social-Structural Change, and Ideological Learning, 33 SOC. 
SCI. RES. 106, 107 (2004) (“Highly restrictive attitudes, characterized by negative beliefs about women in non-
domestic roles, an unwillingness to support women’s rights across a wide range of institutions, and a tendency 
to endorse gender-based differences in power and responsibility have evolved into seemingly more liberal 
attitudes.”). 
 152 As an example of an important societal change, consider the impact of 9/11 on study outcomes: if a 
Muslim brought a religious discrimination case arising from events occurring before September 11, 2001, we 
might be concerned about the external validity of a study into the impact of religious affiliation on 
employment outcomes conducted after September 11, 2001. 
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of applicable rules that permit greater use of social fact studies and to provide 
guidance to practitioners and researchers contemplating a possible social fact 
study. 
A. Prefiling Research 
Both potential plaintiffs and defendants may be interested in gathering and 
analyzing their own data, either to support or defend against a future filing, or 
to assess the likelihood that a claim could succeed should it be filed.  Plaintiffs 
commonly make some effort to gather information before filing to determine 
the potential value of bringing a lawsuit.  With the recent reinterpretations of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 regarding the level of factual detail and 
support needed to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,153 
such prefiling fact investigation is likely to increase.  A social fact study, such 
as a tester study in a failure-to-hire case showing systemic differential 
treatment of male and female applicants, could be an invaluable tool for 
plaintiffs seeking to gain additional factual support for their complaints. 
1. Observational Studies 
The propriety of a social fact study depends on the manner in which the 
study is conducted and the source of information used.  If the research is done 
by systematically observing the potential defendant’s behavior in a public or 
semipublic place (provided no violations occur with respect to the right to 
enter and observe the location or premises in question), then the study should 
pose no legal problems.  Although conducted postfiling, the observational 
study conducted in State v. Soto provides an excellent example of an 
observational study that could have been conducted prefiling using wholly 
public observations.154 
 
 153 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’  
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (citation omitted) (quoting Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63 (“Conley’s ‘no set of 
facts’ language has been questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough. . . .  [A]fter puzzling the 
profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its retirement.  The phrase is best forgotten as an 
incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately, it may 
be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”). 
 154 See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text. 
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2. Surveys and Experiments 
Opportunities such as that found in Soto are limited,155 and therefore much 
prefiling research by potential plaintiffs will either require use of third parties 
as the study participants or the use of deception in interactions with the 
potential defendant to gain information (explicit cooperation by a potential 
defendant in a study to investigate potential wrongdoing is unlikely, of course, 
unless the potential defendant sees some advantage to facilitating a systematic 
study of relevant conditions or behavior).  A common form of third-party study 
is a survey of consumer confusion in a trademark dispute.156  Such studies can 
be performed prefiling without raising any special legal concerns.157  
Furthermore, so long as the researcher uses informed consent or other 
safeguards against participant harm, there should be no special ethical 
constraints on such a study either. 
Where the plaintiff attempts to gain prefiling data from the defendant, 
deception or concealment will sometimes be used by the plaintiff, and the 
defendant may respond by accusing the plaintiff of fraud.  For instance, in 
Education/Instruccion, Inc. v. Copley Management and Development Corp., 
the plaintiffs based their discrimination claims on the results of tester studies, 
and the defendant responded with a counterclaim for misrepresentation, which 
the court deemed valid under state law.158  The court then ruled that “the state 
law, as applied to testers, [ran] afoul of the federal constitution’s Supremacy 
Clause.”159  In another tester case, J.K. Guardian Security Services filed suit 
 
 155 Although one can imagine unobtrusive observational studies providing useful data in important types 
of cases, in particular wage-and-hour class actions, for example, where observers could randomly and 
systematically sample the behavior of different types of workers in organizations permitting public access 
(e.g., restaurants, retail stores). 
 156 See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. 
 157 In a related vein, the FTC could also utilize such studies to investigate claims of false or deceptive 
advertising, and reputational damage caused to high-profile figures by alleged defamatory statements could be 
assessed prefiling using surveys and structured interviews and market analysis in the case of celebrities.  As 
noted below, such prefiling studies on third parties may present discovery issues.  See infra notes 168–77.  
However, to the extent a consulting expert is used to conduct the study in anticipation of litigation, the work 
product doctrine will provide some insulation from discovery of unfavorable study results or “false starts” that 
have to be scrapped. 
 158 No. 81-532-Z, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16667, at *2 (D. Mass. Oct. 14, 1982).  The tort of 
misrepresentation in Massachusetts requires: “First, the tortfeasor must make a false statement which he knows 
to be false.  Second, he must intend to incude [sic] his victim to rely on that statement.  Third, his victim must, 
in fact, so rely.”  Id. at *1–2.  Under Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, testers are defined as “individuals who, 
without an intent to rent or purchase a home or apartment, pose as renters or purchasers for the purpose of 
collecting evidence of unlawful steering practices.”  455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982). 
 159 Education/Instruccion, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16667, at *2. 
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against the testers alleging that they had committed fraud by creating fictitious 
résumés and making false representations about their willingness to work for 
the defendant, but the complaint was dismissed for failure to plead “more 
specific damages.”160  Although these cases ended in pro-tester results, it 
appears that “the issue of potential fraud claims brought against employment 
testers remains unsettled in the vast majority of American jurisdictions.”161 
Challenges to tester standing are unlikely to succeed, at least in federal 
court.  The Supreme Court has ruled that testers have standing to pursue a 
discrimination claim under the Fair Housing Act,162 and Title VII authorizes 
the EEOC to accept charges of employment discrimination “filed by or on 
behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved.”163  Further, the EEOC has 
classified testers as aggrieved persons on grounds that a discriminatory 
rejection of employment constitutes injury regardless of whether an actual 
employment loss occurred.164 
Another means of gaining prefiling information would be via the plaintiff’s 
systematic survey of former or existing employees.  While such a survey may, 
from a scientific perspective, raise selection bias worries, the legal and ethical 
worries arise from placing present and past employees in the position of 
disclosing potentially restricted information and from contacting employees of 
a represented party.  The particular risks of conducting such a study will 
depend on the contracts by which any employees may be bound and on the 
jurisdiction’s particularized privacy and ethical regulations.  Under the Model 
 
 160 Robert Thomas Roos, Note, No Harm, No Fraud: The Invalidity of State Fraud Claims Brought 
Against Employment Testers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1687, 1692–93 (2000) (discussing Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. 
Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
 161 Id. at 1693. 
 162 Havens, 455 U.S. at 373–74; see also Kyles, 222 F.3d at 292 (noting that testers “have been used for 
years to assess compliance with the nation’s fair housing laws”); id. at 299 (“The fact that testers have no 
interest in a job does not diminish the deterrent role they play by filing suit under Title VII.  In that regard, 
testers are situated similarly to unlawfully discharged employees who are ineligible for reinstatement because 
of wrongdoing discovered after they were fired.  Evidence of such wrongdoing limits the relief they may 
obtain under Title VII, but it does not bar them from bringing suit.”); Molovinsky v. Fair Emp’t Council of 
Greater Washington, Inc., 683 A.2d 142, 146 (D.C. 1996) (“Violation of a plaintiff’s statutory rights may itself 
constitute an ‘actual or threatened injury’ sufficient to confer Article III standing.” (quoting Havens, 455 U.S. 
at 373)).  But see Fair Emp’t Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1274 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (“[T]he facts as alleged in the complaint do not come close to indicating that either tester 
‘will again be subjected to the alleged illegality’.  The tester plaintiffs therefore lack standing to seek 
prospective relief.” (citation omitted) (quoting City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983))). 
 163 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b) (2006). 
 164 EEOC Compliance Manual (BNA) No. 915.002 (May 22, 1996), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
policy/docs/testers.html. 
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Rules of Professional Conduct, counsel for one party is not supposed to contact 
anyone whom counsel knows or should know supervises or regularly consults 
with the opposing party’s counsel concerning the matter, has authority to bind 
the opposing party, or whose act or omission could be imputed to the other 
party for purposes of civil or criminal liability.165  Thus, so long as the contacts 
are with nonparticipant, low-level employees, such contacts are unlikely to be 
ethical violations, depending on the particular jurisdiction’s interpretation of 
the applicable ethical rules.166  Though studies by potential defendants are far 
less common, they do occur.  In particular, applicants and employees may be 
subjected to testing as a condition of employment, and employees seen as 
posing risks in the workplace may be subjected to psychological assessments 
and treatment as a condition of continued employment.167  Whether the results 
of these studies can be used in future litigation will depend on the contractual 
terms of the particular employment relationship and applicable privacy 
regulations.  Thus, the same difficulties discussed with respect to plaintiff’s 
prefiling studies of defendants would be present in the converse situation. 
3. Discoverability 
When plaintiffs or defendants engage in studies of themselves, the concern 
is not about the legality and ethics of gathering the data but rather what should 
happen should the study yield unfavorable results.  For instance, in Hudson v. 
General Dynamics Corp., counsel for potential plaintiffs distributed 
questionnaires to two groups of individuals: (1) plaintiffs represented by or 
seeking representation by counsel; and (2) current and former employees of the 
defendant identified as potential witnesses.168  Defendants sought to discover 
the questionnaire responses, but plaintiffs sought protection under both the 
attorney–client privilege and the work product privilege.169  The court ruled 
that questionnaires administered initially to offer legal assistance were 
protected by the attorney–client privilege,170 but questionnaires sent to former 
 
 165 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (1983). 
 166 See id. R. 4.2 cmt. 8 (“The prohibition on communications with a represented person only applies in 
circumstances where the lawyer knows that the person is in fact represented in the matter to be discussed.  This 
means that the lawyer has actual knowledge of the fact of the representation; but such actual knowledge may 
be inferred from the circumstances.”). 
 167 See Constance Weisner et al., Substance Use, Symptom, and Employment Outcomes of Persons with a 
Workplace Mandate for Chemical Dependency Treatment, 60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 646 (2009) (noting that 
employer mandates pressure individuals to enter chemical dependency treatment programs). 
 168 186 F.R.D. 271, 275 (D. Conn. 1999). 
 169 Id. at 273. 
 170 Id. at 276. 
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employees solely to solicit witness statements were not protected, even though 
some of the respondents later sought representation from the attorneys.171  
Because these initial questionnaires were completed not for the purpose of 
obtaining legal advice and prior to the existence of any attempt by the recipient 
to create an attorney–client relationship, responses to the initial questionnaire 
fell outside any attorney–client privilege.172 
Similarly, the Hudson court ruled that the work product doctrine applied to 
the original questionnaires received from plaintiffs seeking representation, 
except with respect to questionnaires to potential witnesses who later became 
the attorneys’ clients.173  The court ruled that defendants failed to show a 
“substantial need” for the first set of questionnaires174 but that the second set of 
“questionnaires [were] simply witness statements with none of the indicia or 
purpose of any privilege.”175  Studies by a corporate defendant of the behavior 
of its own employees raise similar risks of disclosure if care is not taken to 
ensure the attorney–client or work product privilege applies.176  In our view, 
greater use of internal social fact studies should be encouraged by giving 
greater protection to studies undertaken for self-critical purposes.177 
B. Postfiling Research 
In the postfiling period, the interest of a party in conducting a social fact 
study of the opposing party will, in almost every case, be determined as an 
aspect of the discovery process.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were 
originally drafted at a time when social fact research was relatively 
 
 171 Id. at 277. 
 172 Id.  The court ruled that there could be no retroactive application of the attorney–client privilege.  Id. 
 173 Id. at 276–77. 
 174 Id. at 276 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 175 Id. at 277.  The court also ruled that “[a]ny claim of work product as to the blank questionnaire itself 
was waived by plaintiffs’ attorney when the questionnaire was sent out to third party former employees.”  Id. 
 176 See, e.g., Paul E. Starkman, Tips and Traps for the Unwary When Auditing and Measuring the 
Effectiveness of Corporate Compliance and Ethics Programs: An Outside Counsel’s Perspective, in 
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS INSTITUTE 2009, at 695, 708–09 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, 
Course Handbook Ser. No. 18176, 2009) (discussing ways to protect audit results from discovery, and 
suggesting that the “self-evaluative” privilege, the attorney–client privilege, or the work product privilege may 
protect results if audits were performed in anticipation of litigation). 
 177 Accord Greg Mitchell, Good Scholarly Intentions Do Not Guarantee Good Policy, 95 VA. L. REV. 
BRIEF 109, 115 (2010), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2010/02/28/mitchell.pdf (“Companies are in 
the best position to detect and correct workforce disparities.  We need to create a set of legal rules and policies 
that reward internal monitoring and self-correction and that penalize deliberate ignorance about the 
discriminatory impact of a company’s personnel policies.”). 
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uncommon, but a number of the Rules can be read to authorize social fact 
studies as part of the discovery process. 
1. Social Facts Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
The most straightforward means for a plaintiff, for instance, to acquire 
relevant documents from a defendant is through Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26.  The Rule requires a defendant to produce relevant documents 
relating, for example, to its employment practices,178 and it serves as the 
foundation (along with Rules 33 and 34) for the exchange of information now 
regularly used as the basis for statistical social fact studies of candidate or 
employee data as well as the case documents and deposition testimony used in 
social framework analysis. 
Another source of data for a social fact study may be an observational 
study conducted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34, which provides 
access to party premises “so that the requesting party may inspect, measure, 
survey, photograph, test, or sample the property or any designated object or 
operation on it.”179  Thus, an expert who seeks to observe the allegedly 
discriminatory employers on-site in the “ordinary course of business” could 
invoke Rule 34 as authority.180  Rule 34 would be most useful for a plaintiff 
conducting unobtrusive observational studies, but it could be extended to 
include experimental studies and surveys that directly relate to the issues in 
contention.181  Regardless of whether the studies require public or private 
access to company records, sites, or employees, Rule 34 should afford the 
plaintiff a court-mandated opportunity to access the needed data. 
 
 178 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) (describing a party’s duty to disclose). 
 179 Id. 34(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 180 See, e.g., Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, C01-1351 TEH, 2007 WL 
3231706, at *4 (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2007) (allowing experts to enter a prison to confer with and 
interview staff during on-site inspection, as long as staff members were “in the ordinary course of business” 
and “reasonably available”); Morales v. Turman, 59 F.R.D. 157, 159 (E.D. Tex. 1972) (allowing experts in a 
participant observation study to speak with inmates and staff of a prison to “observe the operations of special 
treatment centers and other locations where inmates are incarcerated”).  Observational studies may be useful in 
wage-and-hour lawsuits.  See, e.g., Whiteway v. FedEx Kinkos Office & Print Servs., Inc., No. C 05-2320 
SBA, 2010 WL 1980229, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2010) (admitting a survey showing that defendant’s other 
Center Managers met the company’s expectations); Sepulveda v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 237 F.R.D. 229, 236 
(C.D. Cal. 2006) (admitting a survey based, in part, on the observation of eighteen assistant managers in 
different California stores), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 275 F. App’x 672 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 181 Rule 33 interrogatories could also serve as a foundation for survey requests to defendant-employees, 
but relief from the numerical limits under Rule 33 would likely be necessary.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a)(1) 
(“Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a party may serve on any other party no more than 25 
written interrogatories . . . .”). 
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Also, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35, any party whose mental 
condition is in controversy may be compelled to submit to a mental 
examination by an expert.182  In an employment discrimination case, if the 
plaintiff were to charge, and the defendant to deny, that defendant’s employers 
acted with a subjective and unconscious bias, then perhaps a mental 
examination could provide support for the plaintiff’s claim.183  But to compel a 
party to submit to a mental examination, that party’s mental state must be “in 
controversy,” and there must be “good cause” for the examination.184  One 
party cannot put another party’s mental state in controversy.185  Whether a 
mental condition is actually in controversy may be difficult to determine at 
times.  For example, if a defense expert disputes the underlying science and 
application of the science to the case by a plaintiff’s expert who asserts that 
discriminatory “implicit bias” was likely at work in a company, does this count 
as an affirmative denial that puts the condition into dispute?  In such cases, the 
trial judge must make a discretionary determination of whether the “in 
controversy” and “good cause” requirements have been met.186 
Even if an issue is deemed to be in controversy and there is good cause to 
compel an examination, the person to be examined must be an actual party to 
the action under Rule 35.187  Typically, one who is not a party to an action, but 
merely an agent of the named defendant, is not covered by Rule 35.188  But, in 
Beach v. Beach, the court ruled that “[o]ne who is not a party in form may be, 
for various purposes, a party in substance.”189  Likewise, in Dinsel v. 
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., the court relied on its inherent power to order the 
examination of an employee of a party.190  Therefore, it appears that there is at 
 
 182 Id. 35(a)(1). 
 183 See, e.g., Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114–22 (1964) (suggesting that Rule 35 may extend 
to a defendant asserting his mental condition in defense of a claim). 
 184 FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a). 
 185 Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 186 Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 119; see also Lowe v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 296, 299 (E.D. 
Pa. 1983) (“Good cause has been shown under Rule 35(a) for such an examination.  Plaintiff’s emotional and 
mental state of health has clearly been put in issue by plaintiff.”); Brandenberg v. El Al Isr. Airlines, 79 F.R.D. 
543, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (“In view of the allegations of injury and damage in the complaint, a psychiatric 
examination of the plaintiff under Rule 35(a) is clearly appropriate.”). 
 187 FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a)(1) (“The court . . . may order a party . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 188 See Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 115 n.12 (“Although petitioner was an agent of [the defendant], he was 
himself a party to the action.  He is to be distinguished from one who is not a party but is, for example, merely 
the agent of a party.”); Kropp v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 202 F. Supp. 207, 208 (E.D. Mich. 1962) (holding that 
the court lacked jurisdiction to compel a truck driver, a nonparty and agent of corporate defendant, to submit to 
a physical examination under Rule 35(a)). 
 189 114 F.2d 479, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1940). 
 190 144 F. Supp. 880, 882 (W.D. Pa. 1956). 
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least a possibility of a court compelling an agent of a defendant to submit to a 
mental examination, even if the agent is not a named party who has 
affirmatively placed his mental state in controversy. 
Together, Rules 26, 33, 34, and 35 provide a textual foundation for court-
ordered access by a party to another party or representatives of that party for 
purposes of conducting surveys, observational studies, experimental studies, 
and perhaps individualized mental examinations of opponents.191  A purpose-
based justification for discovery in aid of social fact studies can also be 
supplied, for the clear policy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to 
encourage the exchange of relevant, nonprivileged information among parties 
as was the practice in equity prior to adoption of the Rules.192 
The equitable origins of modern discovery rules are clear.193  The common 
law courts had no procedure to compel the disclosure of potential evidence 
before trial.194  Equity, on the other hand, permitted a bill of discovery and 
required a sworn response.195  For instance, in Kurtz v. Brown, the court 
delineated both the origins and purpose of discovery when it ruled: 
As the object of this jurisdiction in cases of bills of discovery is to 
assist and promote the administration of public justice in other courts, 
they are greatly favored in equity, and will be sustained in all cases 
where some well-founded objection does not exist against the 
exercise of the jurisdiction.196 
These practices continued in the United States in federal (and most state) 
courts until 1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted and 
became available as a model for change in state court procedures.197  The new 
 
 191 Where parties conduct social fact studies on themselves or third parties postfiling, discovery concerns 
should be greatly reduced so long as the study was conducted by a consulting expert for trial preparation 
purposes.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(B) (“Ordinarily, a party may not . . . discover facts known or opinions 
held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of 
litigation . . . .”). 
 192 See Fleming James, Jr., Discovery, 38 YALE L.J. 746, 746 (1929) (“Equity would . . . entertain 
jurisdiction over a bill of discovery in aid of an intended action at law or defense therein, or a defense in an 
equity suit.”). 
 193 See generally id. at 746–49 (discussing the history of the equitable bill of discovery). 
 194 Id. at 746. 
 195 Id. 
 196 152 F. 372, 375 (3d Cir. 1906) (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, STORY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1488 
(Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1988) (1866)). 
 197 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.1, at 397 (4th ed. 2005). 
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Federal Rules eliminated the law–equity distinction and embraced liberal 
discovery procedures.198 
Equally certain is that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are meant to 
encourage the pretrial exchange of information.199  In 1947, in Hickman v. 
Taylor, the Supreme Court recognized this objective: 
[T]he deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and 
liberal treatment.  No longer can the time-honored cry of “fishing 
expedition” serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts 
underlying the opponent’s case.  Mutual knowledge of all the 
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper 
litigation . . . .200 
The federal judiciary continues to honor this view.201  Moreover, the modern 
discovery rules recognize that complete, reliable information is needed for 
more accurate outcomes in trials and early resolution of cases that should not 
go to trial.  Parties thus have a duty to undertake reasonable efforts to respond 
fully and accurately to discovery requests,202 and to supplement and correct 
their past responses as new information becomes available.203 
We therefore propose that the modern question under the Federal Rules 
should be whether, under the circumstances of the case and in light of potential 
costs and benefits, the equities favor granting access to the persons, locations, 
or data requested for social fact purposes.  In making this assessment, the 
potential benefits of a social fact study, which promises reliable science-based 
data directly relevant to the case, should weigh strongly in favor of granting 
access. 
 
 198 See id. (“As one scholar has noted, broad discovery has transcended its role as a ‘mere procedural rule’ 
and become the cornerstone of American civil litigation.” (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No 
Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1694 (1998))). 
 199 See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal 
Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 697 (1998) (“It is probable that no procedural process offers greater 
opportunities for increasing the efficiency of the administration of justice than that of discovery before trial.” 
(quoting Edson R. Sunderland, Foreword to GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL, at iii, iii 
(1932))). 
 200 Id. at 691 (alterations in original) (quoting 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)). 
 201 E.g., Beale v. District of Columbia, 545 F. Supp. 2d 8, 15 (D.D.C. 2008) (“The histories, vagaries and 
progress of each case are unique, and the judge managing discovery is in the best position to weigh the 
equities.”). 
 202 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1) (“By signing, . . . [a] party certifies that[,] . . . with respect to a 
disclosure, it is complete and correct as of the time it is made . . . .”); id. 37(a)(4) (“[A]n evasive or incomplete 
disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond.”). 
 203 Id. 26(e)(1)(A). 
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2. Ethical Issues 
A final concern is whether ethical principles permit a judge to order a 
social fact investigation without the prior consent of the participants, as may be 
necessary in some instances to avoid contamination of study results.  To our 
knowledge, no direct authority on this point exists, but the conclusions of the 
Federal Judicial Center’s Advisory Committee on Experimentation in the Law 
strongly suggest that judicial endorsement of a social fact study without prior 
consent raises no ethical problems if the potential harms to participants are 
slight or the potential gains are substantial204 and any possible harm can be 
minimized with procedures other than prior informed consent.205  Indeed, 
because judges have at their disposal a set of protective measures greater than 
those of Institutional Review Boards, use of deception and potential invasions 
of privacy should raise less concern in postfiling social fact studies than in 
social science studies conducted in academic settings.  In particular, the judge 
can put in place protective orders guaranteeing participant anonymity and 
confidentiality, ordering the findings’ use in court only under seal, limiting the 
uses to which the data can be put, mandating that participants receive particular 
poststudy disclosures in circumstances where prior consent was not possible, 
and providing for avenues of complaint and relief to aggrieved or concerned 
participants.206  In cases of heightened concern about potential harm from 
deception, the court can authorize a small-scale pilot study in which 
participants are debriefed immediately and any harms assessed before the full 
study is authorized. 
CONCLUSION 
Social fact studies can be performed scientifically and ethically.  The legal 
rules for admissibility of social science evidence pose no insurmountable 
 
 204 See ADVISORY COMM. ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EXPERIMENTATION IN 
THE LAW 42–47 (1981).  The Committee’s report was focused on the use of programmatic experiments by 
courts for rule-making purposes.  Id. at 3.  The potential harms associated with assigning litigants to alternative 
rule regimes are likely to be much greater than the potential harms to participants in any of the social fact 
studies discussed in this Article.  Accord Pager, supra note 68, at 127 (“Implicit in [the court rulings permitting 
the use of tester studies] . . . is the belief that the misrepresentation involved in testing is worth the unique 
benefit this practice can provide in uncovering discrimination and enforcing civil rights laws.”). 
 205 See ADVISORY COMM. ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW, supra note 204, at 118–21 (identifying 
procedural and statistical methods that protect the privacy of individual subjects). 
 206 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (listing the circumstances in which a court may issue a protective order).  
Rule 26 gives trial judges broad power to regulate the discovery process through protective orders, including 
protections extended to nonparties from whom information is sought.  See id. (“The court may, for good cause, 
issue an order to protect a party or person . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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hurdle to the use of social facts, as courts today regularly accept social fact 
evidence in a variety of forms.  The legal rules likewise permit the collection 
of the data needed for social fact studies, and in any case, the data needed for 
such studies will often be little different from the data already exchanged in 
discovery. 
The proposal that expert witnesses carry out original empirical research 
relevant to disputed facts in litigation, rather than rely on generic social science 
studies that the experts speculatively link to the case at bar, has been criticized 
on the grounds that conducting case-specific research is “expensive, time-
consuming,” and unlikely to be approved by the parties.207  We understand that 
in some cases having an expert witness engage in speculation may be cheaper, 
quicker, and simpler than conducting original research, but those savings come 
at the cost of scientific reliability.  If experts go beyond providing context for a 
case through a description of general social science research to make claims 
about the meaning of social scientific principles for a particular case, then 




 207 Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework Evidence in Employment 
Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 53 (2009).  Professors Hart and Secunda provide no 
support for their characterization of social fact studies as expensive or time consuming and provide no 
information about the relative costs of social fact studies versus “social framework analysis.”  We see no a 
priori reason why social fact studies will be more burdensome on time or money dimensions.  The cost of each 
approach depends on the scope of the study or analysis undertaken.  For example, a systematic coding of case 
records, wed with a quantitative analysis, could be conducted more reliably and perhaps more efficiently than 
a “social framework analysis,” depending on who serves as the document coders and the scope of the task 
given to the coders. 
 208 See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (“If the expert purports to apply principles and 
methods to the facts of the case, it is important that this application be conducted reliably.”); cf. Monahan et 
al., Ascendance of Social Frameworks, supra note 5, at 1738 (“We recognize that ‘social fact’ studies of the 
kind that would survive Rule 702 scrutiny might be costly and might require judicial involvement to ensure 
access to company personnel.  But this possibility does not, in our view, justify the acceptance of unscientific 
speculation in the form of ‘social framework analysis.’”); Monahan et al., Limits of Social Frameworks, supra 
note 5, at 318 n.58 (“In any event, we are aware of no court rulings that excuse expert witness reliability 
requirements because compliance with those requirements would be difficult or costly.”). 
